The Asia Pacific

 

INTRODUCTION:

Once, the navigator Ferdinand Magellan referred to it as  the Great Ocean. Indeed, the Asia Pacific is an area with blurred boundaries in the sense that oceans serve as a medium for exchanges rather than as a border. Located approximately between 90° E and 150° E longitude, and between 10° S and 60° N latitude, covering a significant portion of the Earth's surface, the Pacific region is an immense space of islands and archipelagos where a complex history prevails, marked by the encounter of two great civilizations: that of India and that of China, followed by the convergence of two major universalist religions: Islam and Christianity. The mixing of populations has created a community that is as divided and diverse as the Balkans or Central America. External influences have deposited so many layers that it would require geological-like work to distinguish all the elements.

If we focus on the numerous archipelagos that dot this vastness, the area of land is small, the population living there is modest, and economic activity is negligible. However, if we include the coastal countries, the strategic reality is striking. In fact, some of the most populous, largest, most powerful, and resource rich countries are all stakeholders, and their territories border the seabed most abundant in natural resources. Among these countries are those of East Asia, such as China, India, and Indonesia.

On the other hand, this vastness has long made contact between its two shores difficult. Thus, the Asia-Pacific has remained, until recently, on the margins of the world system. However, since World War II, a remarkable evolution has strengthened the position of Pacific coastal countries in global production. The weakness of Asian economies, devastated by the conflict, and the fear of communism, which took hold in China and advanced in the Indochinese Peninsula, led the Americans, the main victors of the war, to support the reconstruction of the Japanese economy and to invest heavily in other countries in the region.

The Korean War was the catalyst for a spectacular economic boom, particularly for Japan, marking the beginning of an exceptional period of high growth that Japanese entrepreneurs were able to prolong and amplify.

Part of the Japanese growth explains the growth of neighboring countries, as the simple desire to imitate its model was accompanied by a diffusion process that initially affected Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan. These countries became known as the Newly Industrialized Countries NICs or the Four Asian Dragons. Subsequently, development affected a second generation of countries, where entire regions rapidly transformed, notably Malaysia, Thailand, the coastal areas of China, and to a lesser extent the Philippines and Indonesia. As a result, the growth of the Asia Pacific region has been exceptional, with its share of the global economy increasing from 4% in 1960 to 28% in 1996. Thus, observers presented the region as the new economic center of the world, already imagining the United States turning away from old Europe to deepen ties with a triumphant Asia Pacific.

However, the 1997 monetary crisis that affected Asian countries abruptly reversed this trend. In this context, some experts view this episode as a sign of extreme fragility, forecasting the collapse of a region that had developed too quickly and remains exposed to even graver dangers. However, others argue that the difficulties faced by countries in the region are cyclical and should not permanently affect their growth.

In this perspective, it is very pertinent to ask whether the Asia-Pacific region will be a major geopolitical pole tomorrow.

Although the Asia Pacific zone constitutes an area with promising economic potential, it seems difficult to envision it as a major geopolitical pole, at least in the short to medium term, as several difficulties continue to hinder its development, particularly the divergence of interests among great powers, the lack of a multilateral collective security system exacerbating rivalries among emerging regional powers, and above all, the persistence of numerous complex territorial disputes that undermine its stability. Examining the economic performance of the Asia-Pacific region, the divergence of great power interests, the impact of the absence of a multilateral collective security system, and the complexity of territorial disputes will justify the validity of these statements.

I. ECONOMIC POTENTIALITIES:

The Asia Pacific, containing enormous human and natural potential, is an area with promising economic performances.

1. Human Potential:

Indeed, the Asia Pacific is an impressive demographic reservoir.

With 60% of the world’s population, this area is considered a significant demographic power. The Northeastern part, encompassing China, the two Koreas, Macao, and Taiwan, alone has an estimated population of 1.5 billion inhabitants with an average life expectancy of about 74 years.

Moreover, the population of the Asia Pacific is characterized by socio-cultural values specific to this part of the globe. Despite their diversity and relative remoteness, the peoples of these territories share a sense of belonging to the same community within a culturally homogeneous region. Strongly imbued with Confucian values, Asian societies consist of individuals who convert any frustration into energy for work, respect for the group, success, and refusal of humiliation. These cultural values have always made these countries bearers of a strong individuality, holders of an ancestral civilization, and places of gathering for populations able to maintain their unique values.

This human resource is indeed a significant asset for a region fully focused on reoccupying space and appropriating a collective destiny, as the peoples remain proud of their recent prestigious past and eager to make up for lost time in order to play a major role in the company of the Great.

2. Natural Resources:

On the other hand, the Asia Pacific remains rich in natural resources.

The most striking wealth, for an untrained observer, might be the abundant fishery resources, but the region also contains gigantic mineral resources, accounting for 50% of the world's reserves of gas, coal, and uranium, and 21% of oil reserves. These resources are primarily located in Australia for coal, hydrocarbons, uranium, bauxite, iron, lead, and zinc, as well as in Papua New Guinea for copper, gold, silver, and hydrocarbons. Additionally, in terms of energy and fuels, Asia-Pacific countries play a dominant role. For instance, medium-sized countries like South Korea have estimated electric power production capabilities of 2,338 billion kWh. The situation for other metals such as nickel, copper, aluminum, and lead has significantly improved since the end of 1999. Furthermore, according to Francisco Vergara, "a surge in industrial products has particularly benefited Asian producers." Thus, all these elements advocate for a resurgence of the economy in the Asia-Pacific region.

3. Economic Recovery:

Indeed, the resurgence of the Asia Pacific in the global economy is inevitably underway.

In this regard, the renowned economist Thierry de Montbrial from the French Institute of International Relations stated in 1999 about ASEAN countries that the crisis was an entry into a correction period. Moreover, the Wounded Giants, according to Jean-Luc Domenach, managed to withstand the storm and engage in sustainable growth. China was able to navigate the troubled period of 1998-1999 and resist the devaluation of its Yuan. As for the second giant, Japan remains the planet's primary creditor. Throughout the peninsula, indicators are positive, with growth rates ranging from 0.9% to 7.8%. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ranges between $3.3 and $3.8 billion.

In this context, the Asia-Pacific is far from having lost its means to regain a prominent role in the global economy, especially with the new receptiveness to the diagnostics of economists from the International Monetary Fund, the creation of an exclusive economic zone, and the establishment of new markets. Other factors should not be overlooked, such as pragmatism regarding new economic plans, mastery of certain high technologies, particularly those related to space and nuclear energy, and the foreign capital that has begun to flow into the region since the summer of 1999.

Thus, possessing a dynamic human potential, rich in natural resources, and having successfully resisted the adverse effects of the financial crisis, the countries of the Asia-Pacific have all the assets to emerge on the international stage. However, the divergence and opposition of interests among great powers limit their development.

 II- THE DIVERGENCE OF INTERESTS AMONG MAJOR POWERS:

The divergence of interests among major powers hinders the Asia-Pacific from asserting itself as a major geopolitical pole.

21- The Relative Withdrawal of the Americans:

The end of the Cold War initiated a relative withdrawal of the Americans from the Asia Pacific region.

In fact, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the bipolar system opened new perspectives in the Asia Pacific. Thus, the United States now faces a fundamental contradiction between its desire to ensure peace in the area where American forces have been reduced by nearly 20% per year since the early 1990s while preserving its status as a superpower responsible for the security of a region through which 37% of its trade flows.

Despite repeated statements from outgoing President Bill Clinton advocating for the maintenance of a certain level of military presence in the Asia Pacific, especially during his meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto in April 1996, various pressures influencing foreign policy and strategic orientations in the United States, including budgetary, moral, or economic pressures via Congress and the media, raise doubts about the true commitment of the United States in the absence of a clear perception of common threats. Former Philippine President Fidel Ramos stated in February 1997 that the United States should consider any domination of the region by a single power as a direct threat. In fact, many leaders in the Asia-Pacific are particularly concerned about the lack of clearly defined strategic direction from the Americans, while the Chinese increasingly denounce the continued presence of American military forces in the region, which is no longer useful to them since the Soviet threat has disappeared.

Moreover, since the early 1990s, debates have multiplied in the United States about the necessity of maintaining a significant presence in Southeast Asia, with economic interests seeming to outweigh strategic ones. Thus, despite the alliance that binds the two countries, Japan has long appeared as a genuine threat. Economically, Japan consolidates its position in the Asia-Pacific at the expense of the Americans, both economically and strategically.

Economically, while the cumulative investments of the United States in newly industrialized Asian countries were roughly equivalent to those of Japan (10.6 billion dollars from 1994 to 1996 for the U.S. and 11.2 billion dollars for Japan), in the ASEAN states, where economic significance is growing and political weight is essential, Japanese investments during the same period reached 12.6 billion dollars, while those of the United States did not exceed 8.2 billion dollars.

Economic conflicts between the United States, in decline, and a particularly dynamic Japan have multiplied. The dispute over automobiles led to the most serious quarrel in the history of U.S.-Japanese relations. Although it relates to the economy, this rather intense dispute reflects the change in the international status of both the United States and Japan. Since it became an economic giant, Japan is no longer a subordinate partner and can counter American decisions.

Furthermore, strategically, the ongoing reduction of American forces in the region, which have dropped from 135,000 men in 1990 to over 100,000 today, reinforces this feeling of uncertainty; especially since further reductions are being discussed in the event of the disappearance of the North Korean risk, which does not constitute the main threat considered by local governments, despite official statements.

In fact, the United States' engagement in the Asia-Pacific is justified by a series of agreements dating back to the Cold War, some of which have become obsolete. This is particularly the case with the 1951 agreement concluded with the Philippines since the closure of the two major bases of Clark and Subic Bay in 1992, which led to the withdrawal of all permanent American forces from the Southeast Asian theater. Today, the core of the American presence in Asia consists of two security treaties signed with Japan in 1951 and with South Korea in 1953, which allow for the maintenance of a network of bases concentrated in Northeast Asia.

Moreover, pushed beyond the horizon, the American Seventh Fleet, which remains the essential element of the balance of power in the area, relies on its projection capabilities to manage any crisis that might threaten American interests and to play the deterrent role expected of it. The naval gesturing during the Taiwan crisis clearly shows that the United States is not ready to let its naval power be forgotten while continuing a continuous diplomatic action, realized through bilateral agreements with most countries in the Pacific region.

22- The Return of Russia:

On the other hand, Russia is trying to consolidate its position in the Asia-Pacific zone.

Indeed, the collapse of the USSR should not overshadow its Asian reality. Despite its current problems of all kinds, as well as the uncertainties weighing on its political evolution, Russia remains a major power that intends to remain a principal actor in the region, as geography constrains it.

Since the early 1980s, Moscow has indeed shown a renewed interest in the Pacific region, coinciding with the spectacular economic rise of its countries and the success of initial reforms in China. Despite considerable changes, the new Russia has, to some extent, resumed the foreign policy orientations of the Gorbachev Soviet Union in Asia, characterized by a desire for diversification and economic integration in the Asia Pacific zone. However, while Gorbachev emphasized the reorientation of his Asian policy towards the Japanese and Chinese powers, today’s Russia, on the contrary, is tempted to regain, alongside a China whose size is alarming and a very hesitant Japan, an anchorage too quickly abandoned with its former Southeast Asian allies or the Indian subcontinent.

Strategically, Russia refuses any U.S. monopoly in the world, and more specifically in the region, by reaffirming the Asian character of Russian power. In this regard, with the loss of ports in the Baltic and Black Seas, the strategic importance of the Asia Pacific could only be reinforced. Despite its current difficulties, Vladivostok remains a major port access to warm seas, and the Pacific Fleet now constitutes, despite its weaknesses, an essential part of Russia's deterrent force. Thus, although the Russian Far East is often forgotten by a center very occupied by its own difficulties, the sentiment of its strategic importance cannot be neglected. Consequently, Russia seeks to cultivate its relations with the countries of the region.

Moreover, China is an essential element of this new multidirectional policy of Moscow, according to the words of the Russian Foreign Minister. For the People's Republic of China, a weakened and divided democratic Russia represents, in fact, less danger than a Soviet power whose successful political reforms could prove dangerous for the ruling power in Beijing.

Thus, poorly integrated into a transforming global system, Moscow and Beijing are tempted to reaffirm their power in the face of an American monopoly rejected by both sides. High-level meetings between the two countries have resulted in the signing, during former Russian President Boris Yeltsin's visit in April 1996, of a joint declaration defining a new strategic partnership between the two.

Furthermore, economically, Russo Chinese collaboration has allowed Moscow to find in China a lucrative and welcome outlet for arms sales. For its part, Beijing, eager to exploit the anarchy prevailing in Moscow regarding decision making, has fully utilized the acquisition possibilities offered by Russia to improve its military capabilities, particularly in terms of projection. Arms sales from Russia to China thus constitute over 40% of exchanges between the two countries.

On the other hand, to benefit from increased integration in the Asia Pacific region, Russia counts on Japan, which presents undeniable assets. Indeed, despite the territorial dispute over the Kuril Islands, the two countries exhibit a real complementarity. In fact, Japan is the only country in Asia with the necessary capital to upgrade infrastructure in regions like the Russian Far East, integrating it into the most dynamic and developed part of the Asia Pacific zone. In this context, a study published in 1996 by MITI estimated that 300 billion dollars would be needed to develop this area before 2010. In contrast, the raw materials, particularly energy resources, offered by the Russian Far East present essential appeal for a Japan that is highly dependent in this field.

Moreover, in the face of the West, Russia continually declares its ambition to maintain its status as a power in the new global system. As a result, it is not ready to renounce its presence in the Asia-Pacific. In this perspective, it reaffirms, without currently having the means to implement them, its naval ambitions in the South China Sea as a balancing force. Furthermore, after having too quickly distanced itself from its former alliances, Russia, with diminished means, is trying to reestablish closer ties with India and Vietnam, with which new friendship treaties were signed in 1993 and 1994. Russia's participation in the ASEAN Security Forum aligns with the same logic.

23- The Emergence of an Influential Australia:

Similarly, Australia is attempting to strengthen its predominance in the Asia-Pacific region.

For over a hundred years, and until recently, the Asia-Pacific has been for Australia a distant place that inspired ambivalent feelings. Asia has remained a real or potential military threat, which was clearly manifested during World War II and the Second Indochina War, highlighting the image of Asia as a region of danger. However, while Australians have come to regard their North as an unstable and militarily threatening area, the hope of finding a source of interesting economic opportunities has always been present in the minds of political circles. Thus, from the early 1950s, Australia began to forge important trade relations with Japan and later with other countries in the region, with which 60% of Australian exports currently take place.

Conversely, fearful of its Asian neighbors, Australia has remained constantly anxious and aware of the necessity to realize its regional role while safeguarding its national interests, especially those expressed on its Asian borders. Consequently, the second half of the 20th century saw Australia pivot towards its zone, taking control of its international and regional destiny.

In fact, the end of the Cold War marked the conclusion of the great external protections guaranteed by ANZUS in 1952 and the now-defunct SEATO in 1974. It imposed upon Australia a new maturity in foreign relations. Furthermore, the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASEAN in 1987 paved the way for an Australia that, while not being a member, viewed it as a reference for its own policy. Thus, in 1989, it presided over the creation of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation  APEC and from 1994 invested in the ASEAN Regional Forum, which addresses security issues in collaboration with the United States and the European Union.

The general outline of foreign policy indicates Australia's willingness to position its actions within a regional geopolitical framework to better protect itself against an Asian environment still perceived as hostile. Its classical bilateral relations, expressed through alliances, notably with its Indonesian neighbor, converge towards the same objective.

However, while Indonesia's predominant role in Australian foreign policy has never been in doubt, engagement with this large neighbor has always oscillated between curiosity and caution, especially since the end of Portuguese colonization in the East Timor province. Indeed, the circumstances surrounding the departure of the Portuguese and Indonesia's near-immediate control over the former European colony since November 7, 1975, remain undeniably a source of irritation and regret for Australia.

Nevertheless, for over twenty years, Australia has not hesitated to build genuine relations of trust and partnership with Indonesia. This bilateral endeavor reached its peak on December 18, 1995, when both countries signed a security agreement followed by the establishment of an Australia-Indonesia development zone focusing primarily on economic development in the Timor region. Consequently, through such an agreement, Australia succeeded in securing the regional security issue. However, the question of East Timor was downplayed by the agreement. Thus, radical voices in the political sphere contested the accord.

Simultaneously, an unexpected consequence of the 1997 Asian financial crisis would drastically change the geopolitical landscape of the area. From 1998 to 1999, Indonesian governments succeeded one another in urgent circumstances while unrest and disorder prevailed. The Indonesian political system with which Australia had long dealt suddenly found itself in crisis. Australian relations with Asia-Pacific countries took a new turn, especially with the fall of General Suharto’s regime.

In fact, Australia's involvement in the events leading up to the independence referendum in the province and its significant role within the INTERFET multinational force engaged under the auspices of the United Nations provoked sharp tensions with Jakarta.

However, by intervening in East Timor, did Australia affirm or confirm its role as a principal regional actor for peace? Did it not, on the contrary, jeopardize years of patient bilateral and multilateral investments in its zone of influence? With what American support, and with what degree of latitude, does Canberra now find itself positioned as a "gendarme" of the region? Certainly, the mask of ambiguity and forced rapprochement with Jakarta fell in 1999.

All these questions remain without real answers not because only time will provide the necessary clarifications, but rather due to the very nature of Australian foreign policy, which is always characterized by ambiguity. The absence of military threats does not mean that Australia will not face security issues in the region. A brief enumeration of its areas of concern suffices to illustrate how unpredictable the future is, particularly regarding the possibility of renewed unrest in Indonesia or its region. This means that the capabilities of those in charge of Australian foreign policy will often have the opportunity to be put to the test.

Thus, the divergence of interests among great powers and the opposition of their ambitions in the area stand as primary obstacles that, combined with the absence of a multilateral collective security system and the persistence of regional rivalries, hinder the emancipation of the Asia-Pacific to occupy a predominant place on the global stage.

III- RIVALRIES OF REGIONAL POWERS:

The absence of a multilateral collective security system accentuates rivalries among emerging regional powers in the area.

31- The Limits of ASEAN:

Firstly, due to its many weaknesses, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASEAN has proven unable to guarantee security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

When ASEAN was created in 1967, the founding countries aimed only for economic cooperation in a zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality ZOPFAN. However, despite numerous bilateral disputes among its members, it quickly became unavoidable that the organization would be concerned with security issues.

Furthermore, the end of the Cold War very quickly made the member countries aware of the necessity to engage the organization itself in the regional problems and disputes of the area, especially with third countries. Additionally, with the end of the bipolar division and the resolution of the Cambodian conflict, ASEAN was able to expand to include the countries of the Indochinese Peninsula, welcoming Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Cambodia in 1997, while Myanmar formerly Burma gained observer status in 1996.

Similarly, ASEAN acquired a new and genuinely global dimension with the creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1994, which brings together eighteen members: the seven ASEAN countries, their seven dialogue partners namely, Australia, Canada, South Korea, the United States, Japan, New Zealand, and the European Union along with China and Russia, and India, which became associated with the plenary meeting of the ARF in July 1996.

The existence and composition of the ASEAN Regional Forum highlight that the security of the Asia-Pacific is no longer situated within an East-West confrontation. The interdependence in security matters among geographically distant regions is underscored by the participation of Japan, South Korea, and Russia in a security forum sponsored by ASEAN. Thus, it has effectively become the only collective security organization in the region, even though it still lacks any real structure or any collective means, akin to NATO.

However, the ASEAN Regional Forum also acknowledges, on the part of Southeast Asian states, their own limitations and inability to ensure security in their region alone. Its promoters have understood that stability in Southeast Asia can only be guaranteed by linking it to developments further north in the Pacific.

Nevertheless, the ASEAN Regional Forum has its own limitations. Indeed, the ASEAN states designed it as an extension of their own association. It is not, under any circumstances, a binding organization for its members but merely a consultative forum based on a certain pragmatism and a few seemingly simple consensual rules, such as the peaceful resolution of conflicts, respect for sovereignty, and non-interference.

Another attempt to collectively ensure the security of the Asia Pacific region remains the members’ desire to make their region a nuclear-free sanctuary. Thus, on December 15, 1995, representatives of the seven members of the association, to which Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar were associated, signed the Bangkok Treaty establishing a nuclear free zone in Southeast Asia. However, this treaty encountered hesitations and objections from China and the United States.

Thus, ASEAN and its forum, which are certainly fruitful consultation organizations, have failed to agree on resolving the two major conflict points in Northeast Asia, namely those of Korea and Taiwan. Moreover, neither North Korea nor Taiwan are present at the forum. Likewise, it has not succeeded in resolving the recent crisis in East Timor peacefully.

Consequently, establishing a multilateral collective security system in the Asia Pacific remains a task that requires time and, above all, greater political maturity on the part of all countries in the region.

32-Sino Japanese Rivalries:

The strategic vacuum created by the end of the Cold War and the relative withdrawal of the United States allowed China and Japan to emerge as rival powers. Since the onset of the economic reform and opening policy initiated by Deng Xiaoping, China has experienced an average growth rate of 10% per year, surpassing 13% in 1993 and 11.5% in 1994. This substantial economic progress has enabled China to establish a foundation for its influence in the Asia-Pacific region that is more solid than mere ideological adherence.

In this context, strategically, since the mid-1980s, Chinese leadership has opted for a logic of easing tensions and integrating into the global system, which is necessary for continued development. Deng Xiaoping characterized the country's strategy as one of long term peace, although he did not rule out the risks of localized conflicts of low intensity. However, with the disappearance of the Soviet threat, China’s strategy in the Asia Pacific region entered a second phase. While the new orientations of the 1980s did not fundamentally change, the new means provided by economic development for the Chinese military, along with the ideological hardening of the regime, noticeable since 1989, have favored a more offensive orientation of the previously developed theses. The logic of defense along the borders has thus evolved into an offensive logic focused on acquiring new capabilities for forces surrounding Chinese territory. The military strategy assigned to the People's Liberation Army aims to eliminate any internal or external threat and to defend a claimed vital space within strategic borders that do not align with the current artificial borders of the People's Republic of China.

Thus, freed from any land threat, especially with the disappearance of the Soviet menace, China is turning towards the seas. Acquiring the capacity for high seas action is indeed seen in Beijing as the true criterion for belonging to the club of great powers, and the symbol of China's assertion of power in the Asia-Pacific region.

In this perspective, Chinese authorities have adopted a strategic plan for the development and modernization of protection capabilities for the armed forces, particularly naval and aerial forces. In this context, China acquired 40 submarines in 1995, while its air force was bolstered by 24 Russian fighter jets added to the 26 already acquired in 1992.

On the other hand, the Japanese are seeking to free themselves from the 1945 armistice clauses that limit their freedom of action in order to assert their presence in the Asia-Pacific region.

Indeed, at the end of World War II, Japanese defense policy was solidly framed by Article 9 of the constitution and the security treaty with the United States. The former prohibited Japan from participating in a collective defense system, while the latter placed it effectively under American protection, granting it only the right to very controlled self-defense forces.

However, the evolving situation during the Cold War and especially Japan's spectacular economic rise, bringing it to the level of the second largest economic power in the world, have naturally led this country to increasingly consider its responsibilities in the Asia-Pacific region and on the international stage. Thus, in May 1981, Japan decided to extend its naval defense perimeter to 1,000 nautical miles. Then, in December 1986, it abandoned the principle of limiting its military budget to 1% of its GDP. Consequently, its defense budget became the second largest in the world. The Japanese armed forces are, by far, the most advanced in the region, characterized particularly by the high technical level of their equipment.

In fact, with the end of bipolarity, several reasons justify this rearmament. First, the necessity to appear powerful in the face of the possibility of a reunified Korea, which, united and strong, could become a rival in all areas. Secondly, the desire to maintain a balance with a China that is seeking to assert its power. In this context, a strong Japan is believed to have a deterrent influence on the evolving situation in Taiwan, on the security of vital maritime communication routes for its economy, and on an inevitable negotiation with Russia regarding the retrieval of the Kuril Islands.

Moreover, until today, the Japanese naval and air forces, while very significant, are mainly equipped to ensure surveillance and defense, excluding any capability for force projection, especially aerial and naval forces. It is certain that if China were to acquire such capabilities through the purchase of aircraft carriers, it would likely compel Japan to do the same. However, not only would this further destabilize the balance in the region, but such a decision would likely also awaken memories in other countries that the timid official regrets of Japan have not completely erased, especially since, without it being possible to speak of a revival of Japanese militarism, we must acknowledge that within the population, the consciousness and pride of Japan's success and power have led to a nationalism that is unabashed.

It is in this context that we must assess the U.S.-Japan agreement signed by President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto on April 15, 1996, dubbed the "Alliance for the 21st Century." According to the joint statement, this agreement no longer aims solely at the defense of Japan but also at regional stability. In fact, this agreement, described by all specialists as the most important event since 1945 in U.S. Japan relations, constitutes the first breach of Article 9 of the constitution by defining a genuine military cooperation between the two countries. It is also the only military organization in the Asia Pacific region. Thus, Japan is no longer a passive actor content to host U.S. forces  currently estimated at 47,000 personnel in the archipelago; it has become a full partner capable of participating with the United States in maintaining peace in the Pacific.

33-Indo-Chinese Rivalries:

Finally, the Asia-Pacific region remains fragile due to the antagonistic relations maintained by China and India for over three decades.

Indeed, the territorial conflict of 1962 concerning the delimitation of the border between the two countries in Tibet was compounded by an ideological rivalry at the beginning of the 1960s. Just a year after their confrontation in the Himalayas, India and China found themselves aligned with opposing blocs in the Cold War. Moreover, the political asylum granted by India to the Tibetan spiritual leader Dalai Lama has added to the tensions between the two countries.

The rivalry between India and People's China extends far beyond the strictly military framework. It encompasses the status of a regional power, even of an emblematic power of Asia on the global scale, and takes place in the strategic domain.

India aims to learn from China's regional stature. However, China is seen as a goal but not a model. Feared by its immediate neighbors, with whom the Middle Empire has traditionally maintained relations of vassalage, notably Korea and Vietnam, as well as by other Asian states, China is regarded by all countries in the region as the main threat to their security. Meanwhile, India seeks to be one of the poles of power and influence in the Asia Pacific region, alongside China and Japan, without arousing the same distrust that the latter two provoke: the former due to its future power and the latter due to its militaristic past. Thus, its primary objective is to become the dominant power but not hegemonic. However, achieving this goal depends first on its ability to maintain good relations with its Asian neighbors.

In this framework, India has embarked since 1997 on a new foreign policy towards South Asian states, based on the principles of good neighborliness. This policy has quickly yielded excellent results, particularly with Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. However, the most challenging bilateral relationship remains that with Pakistan. The warming of relations with Pakistan is hindered by China's support for Pakistan's nuclear and ballistic programs, notably through the sale of combat aircraft, parts for medium range ballistic missiles, technical assistance, and the sale of magnetic rings intended for uranium enrichment.

China's support for Pakistan indeed strengthens this country’s position relative to India and, by extension, weakens India’s position against China by forcing it to contend with two fronts.

However, to avoid playing into China’s hands, India refuses to confine the scope of its influence to the subcontinent, which would, moreover, contradict its economic interests. Therefore, New Delhi has undertaken to strengthen its relations with Southeast Asian states. Politically and strategically, the aim is to highlight India's contribution to regional stability as a counterweight to China. In fact, India seeks to dispel Southeast Asian states' fears of its military power by drawing attention to China's hegemonic ambitions. Additionally, economically, the goal is to multiply ties with the region's dynamic economies, despite the consequences of the 1997 financial crisis, in order to accelerate its own development.

Furthermore, during the autumn of 1995, in preparation for a treaty on the denuclearization of Southeast Asia covering the territory of ten countries, the states in the region became aware of their geographic proximity to India, a nuclear power they had previously neglected in their security analyses. In 1996, the decision to include India as a dialogue partner in the ASEAN Regional Forum ARF, alongside China, marked the translation of this awareness and represented a first step towards greater integration of India into the Asia Pacific. However, India continues to face the omnipresence of China. By maintaining a privileged relationship with two of India's neighboring countries, China evokes in India a sense of encirclement.

In this vein, the success of India's regional initiatives will influence its global status, which constitutes its second strategic objective. Nevertheless, to be recognized as a power pole equal to China, New Delhi believes it must demonstrate its capacity to ensure its own defense, choose the most suitable means without yielding to Western pressures in general and American pressures in particular, and not definitively renounce its nuclear or ballistic program. In this framework, India refuses to sign treaties prohibiting nuclear tests or non proliferation, arguing that it is the only country in the world faced with two nuclear states: Pakistan and China. It also argues that other nuclear powers must make firm commitments to reduce their nuclear arsenals.

Similarly, Indian authorities refuse to subscribe to the ideal of peaceful coexistence  that the Chinese are attempting to impose on the whole region. This situation echoes a recurrent paradox that has marked the history of Sino Indian relations since the 1950s: the quest for a common ground on which the two countries could establish a balanced partnership, while neither could accept the other's terms, given that the two are two competing models of power, governance, and identity. In this context, India aims to safeguard its sovereignty and influence in the Asia Pacific region, while China aspires to impose its model and assert its power, thus leading to the potential for future clashes.

Thus, the Asia-Pacific region is characterized by a variety of complex rivalries that underline the need for sustainable solutions to promote peace and stability. It is imperative to understand the geopolitical dynamics at play in order to navigate the intricacies of this increasingly important region on the global stage.

IV- THE COMPLEXITY OF TERRITORIAL DISPUTES:

The complexity of territorial disputes hinders the geopolitical growth of the Asia-Pacific region.

41- The Korean Peninsula:

First, the Korean Peninsula constitutes a place in the Asia-Pacific where the risk of a confrontation constantly threatens the stability of the region.

Indeed, almost half a century after the end of hostilities, the Korean War is not officially over. The risks of conflict are still present, exacerbated by the American presence on the peninsula. The arms race between the two Koreas remains another destabilizing factor in the Asia-Pacific region.

Thus, the nuclear crisis of 1993-1994 reminded us how much Korea remains a hotspot of tension. The question was whether North Korea truly possessed the bomb. On March 12, 1993, pressed to accept the inspection of its nuclear facilities, Pyongyang announced that it was withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, triggering a crisis that would only end with the international agreement on October 21, 1994, regarding the modernization of its nuclear program. In the meantime, pressure had mounted significantly, with a war psychosis and the deployment of PATRIOT anti-missile systems in South Korea. Since then, dialogue between the two estranged brothers has timidly begun, as numerous disputes hinder reconciliation between the two Koreas.

After the summit of the two Korean presidents in June 2000, preceded by high-level visits, consultations revolved around the most thorny issue complicating any sustainable rapprochement between the two countries on the peninsula: how to reduce military confrontation between the North and the South. This question is delicate because it directly involves the United States, which has 37,000 soldiers and 100 fighter planes stationed in South Korea. Thus, with the 'nuclear umbrella' they deploy over the South, they tilt the balance of power in favor of Seoul. Washington refuses to discuss this hypothesis, claiming that the American presence on the peninsula is not only deterrent but also crucial for the stability of the entire Asia-Pacific region.

However, this analysis overlooks an important dimension. In fact, North Korea has real security concerns due to the presence of Americans and their technological superiority. As a result, it feels vulnerable to potential American preemptive strikes.

In this context, it uses its missiles as a deterrent against any potential threat. Moreover, the price of their elimination should be accompanied by significant reductions in American conventional forces, as well as concessions regarding the nuclear umbrella.

On the other hand, another more complex dispute opposes the two parties. The 1953 armistice must be replaced by a peace treaty. However, both parties remain stuck in a procedural impasse that obscures the more fundamental issues. Washington and Pyongyang diverge not only on replacing the armistice procedures but also on whether to replace them before or after North Korea withdraws its frontline conventional forces.

Indeed, the signatories of the 1953 armistice were North Korea, China, and American General Mark W. Clark acting on behalf of the United Nations Command, which had provided multilateral cover for the American intervention in the conflict. Thus, Pyongyang demands an American North Korean peace treaty to replace the truce. But Washington and Seoul insist on the treaty being signed by both Koreas. Moreover, the Americans claim that they are not part of the 1953 agreement because General Clark, although American, signed it on behalf of the United Nations Command.

In fact, the American maneuvers can be explained by political considerations. At heart, they reveal enormous concern from the Pentagon, as normalizing relations with North Korea and replacing the armistice clauses could jeopardize the American military presence in Korea and could lead, on the other hand, to a reunified Korea. The latter, spanning 220,000 km² and about 70 million inhabitants, combining the North's resources, the South's industrial potential, and the formidable national determination of all Koreans, could become a power center capable of changing the geopolitical landscape in the region.

Thus, as long as the United States does not break the impasses and engage the entire peninsula in the post Cold War era, the hot and cold winds continue to blow across the region.

42- The Taiwan Issue:

The Taiwan issue also constitutes a thorny problem that threatens the stability of the Asia-Pacific region.

Indeed, located halfway between North Korea and ASEAN in the South, the island of Taiwan could one day find itself in the eye of the storm. The problem remains one of reunification. Since 1949, this dispute has been unresolved.

For Mao, the liberation of Taiwan by force was a matter of internal Chinese affairs, and General Chiang Kai-shek held a similar view, claiming he would reconquer the mainland through military action. However, after the crises of 1954-1955 and 1958, during which Mao failed in his attempts at reconquest, both Chinas have lived under the accepted idea in Beijing and Taipei that neither side would abandon the ultimate goal of reunification. This status quo, which has ensured political stability, has allowed Taiwan to achieve spectacular economic development, reflected in an annual growth rate of 8%.

Today, however, while it is true that in mainland China, the myth of reunification still reflects a reality that sometimes expresses itself brutally and without compromise, supported by the vast majority of the people, who remain subject to the propaganda of the central power, it is uncertain whether this still corresponds to the wishes of the inhabitants of Taiwan, who likely view the prospect of a reunified China as a very distant possibility.

In fact, as the myth of reunification through force served as the foundation for the nationalists' power, the myth of Taiwan's independence, based on Taiwanese identity, would form the political foundation of an internal opposition movement uniting indigenous Taiwanese, weary of the unchallenged power of Chiang Kai-shek's party, whose hegemony was gradually undermined by the scale of dissent. This dissent pushed President Lee Teng-hui, a native of the island who succeeded Jiang Jing-guo in January 1988, to make significant concessions to the Taiwanese sentiment of the population.

Furthermore, favored by political openness and supported by an increasingly numerous middle class, the independence movement Democratic Progressive Party developed a program to break away from the myth of reunification, advocating for the establishment of a Republic of Taiwan and affirming the birth of a distinct identity for the island, more Taiwanese than Chinese.

Moreover, the strength of the movement and the growing influence of native Taiwanese in political life contributed to shifting Taipei's foreign policy, which has been characterized since the early 1990s by an increasingly assertive resistance to Beijing and its principle of reunification, deemed unacceptable by the Taiwanese, as it relegates the island to the subordinate rank of a province. Thus, Taiwan militates ambiguously for the international community to recognize the island as a political entity on an equal footing with Beijing. To this end, it continues to raise the issue of its representation at the United Nations and strives to achieve a higher profile in international forums. However, this policy faces obstacles from Beijing, which pressures the international community to curb Taiwanese initiatives. In this context, in 1992, the communist China obstructed the island's admission to the GATT, unhesitatingly triggering a diplomatic crisis in 1995 when the United States granted a visa to the island's president, Mr. Lee Teng-hui, for a private visit.

Beijing perceives that Taiwan is moving toward de facto independence and that relations between the two Chinas are gradually changing, thus escaping the framework desired by the  Middle Kingdom and shifting towards a state-to-state relationship. This fear was sharply expressed in 1995, just before the first election by universal suffrage, to deter the Taiwanese from voting for their nemesis Lee Teng-hui, accused of pro-independence tendencies, by conducting live-fire exercises and launching ballistic missiles that blocked navigation in the Strait.

Thus, the show of force, through which Beijing asserted its determination, despite the intervention of the U.S. Navy and the relatively measured reactions from the rest of the international community, along with the damage caused by the crisis to the Taiwanese economy, revealed the unrealistic and dangerous nature of the myth of Taiwan's independence. It also demonstrated how delicate and fluctuating the relations between Beijing and Taipei are, given that their political positions are now incompatible. However, even though the prospects remain clouded by the political uncertainties prevailing in both blocs, it is unlikely that crises that may arise, despite the election of the new Taiwanese president, Mr. Chen Shui-bian, would lead to a major derailment.

Thus, unless there is a drastic change in the balance of power, this situation is expected to persist and continue to constitute one of the hot spots in the Asia-Pacific region.

43 - The South China Sea:

Given its undeniable strategic importance, the South China Sea is subject to multiple claims from all the coastal countries, thus accentuating the fragility of the Asia-Pacific zone.

Indeed, on February 25, 1992, the Chinese parliament adopted a maritime law that places most of this sea under its sovereignty. This unilateral decision has fueled rumors of conflicts ever since; as defined by the new law, Chinese territory now includes the Senkaku, Parcel, and Spratly Islands. This territory covers most of the South China Sea and its resources.

Legally, China's claims remain vague. To legitimize them, China relies on the extent of its continental shelf and on historical reasons that it refuses to clarify. Furthermore, the Chinese claims appear deliberately vague geographically. In fact, the claimed area includes exploitation zones and installations controlled by Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines.

In reality, China aims to assert its power in the region for several reasons. Historically, the South China Sea crystallizes the fragility of China's defense. It was through this route that Western powers came to control the region in the 19th century, that nationalists escaped revolutionary forces, and that Americans and Soviets established their regional dominance during the Cold War. Thus, controlling the southern flank is crucial for the security of the People's Republic of China.

Moreover, the South China Sea connects to the Indian Ocean in the southwest via the Malay and Indonesian straits. The territorial waters of the Spratly Islands command maritime traffic, especially oil traffic, through the Malacca Strait between the Middle East and Japan. These islands are, therefore, located on one of the main arteries of global maritime trade. In 1995, a quarter of the world's maritime trade transited on either side of the archipelago. Thus, China would exercise control not only over maritime routes but also over the dense network of air routes over the region.

Additionally, the subsoil of the archipelago contains hydrocarbon reserves estimated by the Chinese at 205,000 billion barrels of oil equivalent B.E.P. Consequently, a fierce battle is already raging between Vietnamese and Chinese oil companies. The respective energy situations of the two countries illuminate the true significance of this dispute. For Hanoi, the exploitation and export of hydrocarbons are at the heart of its economic reconstruction. Representing 12% of foreign investment since 1988 and nearly a third of exports, oil is among the main sources of revenue. However, the Vietnamese continental shelf, largely claimed by the Chinese, contains oil reserves estimated at between 3 and 5 billion barrels.

Similarly, in China, energy resources condition industrial development. The deposits exploited on its territory are depleting, and oil production no longer meets the demand generated by an average economic growth of 10% annually over the past ten years. In this perspective, the exploitation of new deposits in the Spratlys constitutes a significant issue for Beijing.

However, Beijing's attempt to seize hydrocarbons in the South China Sea could end up pitting it against almost all the coastal states. For instance, Chinese claims cover the Indonesian Natuna Islands, notably the gas field of the same name located 250 km northeast of these islands. It is one of the largest gas fields in the world, estimated at 137,000 billion cubic meters.

Beijing's verbal threat to resort to force to defend its sovereignty adds to the uncertainties. In fact, not only has the People's Liberation Army (PLA) multiplied its operations since the early 1990s, but it is also increasingly intervening in the southern part of the South China Sea. China militarily occupies eight islets in the archipelago. It is not the only one, as Vietnam occupies about twenty, the Philippines eight, Malaysia three, and Taiwan one.

Moreover, the conflict plunges the United States into blatant contradictions. On the one hand, budgetary constraints and non-interventionism lead them to retreat to traditional military positions. On the other hand, the presence of numerous American oil companies in the region, uncertainties regarding military transport, the desire to contain Chinese ambitions, and requests from countries in the region compel them to intervene in the debate. However, unable to choose among so many imperatives, Washington plays on all fronts: trade pressures and manipulation of the Taiwanese issue combine with military gestures.

Furthermore, since the late 1980s, most of the mediation efforts have been made by the Indonesians. Having no claims on the islands of the archipelago, Jakarta organized annual meetings to discuss ways to "avoid a potential conflict in the South China Sea." However, its initiative has undergone severe shocks. In fact, in 1993, Indonesia lost its neutrality upon realizing that the Chinese claim line included the Natuna Islands. In 1994, the Chinese did not hesitate to install a new sovereignty marker on the Da Lac reef. Sino-Philippine relations deteriorated in 1995 following the discovery of new Chinese military installations on Mischief Reef.

Currently, the slightest reef in these islands is teeming with soldiers. The waters surrounding the archipelago are traversed by warships, monitored by aircraft filled with electronics and spy satellites. The search for a global solution has not progressed. However, Chinese authorities do not fail to remind that they are ready to use force to enforce their sovereignty.

Thus, all the ingredients for a conflict seem to be gathered. The return of Taiwan and its reunification with Beijing represents a significant issue for the Middle Kingdom, the Korean dispute fuels the escalation, and rivalries over oil in the South China Sea exacerbate the divergences between the majority of countries, creating an atmosphere of insecurity and instability in the Asia-Pacific zone.

CONCLUSION:

In summary, due to its significant potential and economic recovery capabilities, the time for the Asia-Pacific region could genuinely resonate on the clock of growth. However, it is not positioned to assert itself as a major geopolitical pole, at least in the short to medium term. Indeed, it is far from achieving political equilibrium and maturity. The future remains uncertain. The region is susceptible to the influences of major powers, particularly its more turbulent members whose disputes and rivalries could not only slow the modernization and development process undertaken in recent years but also undermine the stability and security of the area, limiting its ambitions.

Furthermore, in this economically growing region, China and Japan are already the true competitors for future supremacy. However, standing in the way of political leadership is the Land of the Rising Sun, whose position has been further solidified since its alliance for the 21st century with the United States, challenging the power hierarchy established after World War II. Additionally, the establishment of a common interest axis between Tokyo and the non-Chinese world, along with Japan's increased engagement on the international political stage, appears to respond to the rise of a more concerning and threatening China.