Greece and Turkey

Introduction:

Before delving into the heart of the matter, it is important to provide an overview of Greece and Turkey.

Greece, a country in Southeastern Europe with an area of 132,000 km², is both continental, peninsular  Peloponne, and insular Ionian Islands, Cyclades, Sporades, and Cret. It has a population of around 11 million inhabitants, with nearly a third concentrated in Athens and its surrounding areas.

As for Turkey, it is a country in Western Asia including the southeastern tip of the Balkan Peninsula  with an area of 780,000 km², of which its European part represents less than one-thirtieth of the total area. Its population is around 70 million, mostly concentrated along the coast, particularly around the Sea of Marmara.

Both countries border the Aegean Sea, with overlapping maritime boundaries in this strategically important area, allowing passage to the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.

In the 1820s, Greece gained independence from Ottoman rule. A century later, modern Turkey emerged from a struggle against Greek invasion forces, who sought to build a new empire on the ruins of the Ottoman one. In 1920, the Greeks, supported by Great Britain, landed in Asia Minor. Sultan Mehmed signed the Treaty of Sèvres. In 1922, the Greco Turkish War ended with the crushing defeat of the Greeks and the signing of an armistice. Greece, which had obtained Thrace and the Smyrna region, was forced to cede them to Turkey. The conflict seemed to settle with the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. To diffuse a potentially explosive ethno political situation, both countries agreed to a forced population exchange. However, from 1955, the Cyprus conflict reignited tensions. The last attempt at Greco-Turkish détente, initiated by Andreas Papandreou and Turgut Özal, dates back to 1988 but failed due to the complexity of the Aegean Sea dispute, which almost led to war in 1996.

Since 1999, a new phase has emerged. The earthquake in the Marmara region in August triggered a wave of solidarity in Greece, fostering a new bilateral climate, which was further strengthened by Turkish sympathies after the Athens earthquake in October. This long-desired rapprochement could help ease their strained relations.

Therefore, it is appropriate to ask whether Turkey and Greece are heading towards normalizing their relations.

Although both Greece and Turkey are NATO members and allies to varying degrees with Europe, their tentative rapprochement, marked by Greece's lifting of its veto on Turkey's European Union candidacy and the emergence of earthquake diplomacy, suggests a potential normalization. However, their deeply rooted historical conflicts and ongoing major geopolitical divergences confirm that tension still remains, and true rapprochement may not happen anytime soon.

To illustrate our argument, we will first analyze the elements favoring Greco Turkish rapprochement, then examine the hereditary animosity still undermining their relations, and finally discuss the persistent geopolitical divergences between the two countries.

I. Elements Favoring Rapprochement:

Both Turkey and Greece are NATO members and, to varying degrees, allied with Europe. Their rapprochement was initiated by the climate of solidarity developed during the earthquakes and was further solidified by the lifting of Greece’s veto on Turkey’s EU membership candidacy.

1. NATO Membership:

Turkey and Greece are the guardians of the southern bastion of the Atlantic Alliance. Within NATO, they attempt to work together, setting aside their differences.

The Ottoman Empire played a significant role in Europe for about six centuries. This Ottoman past gives Turkey certain rights and the ability to assert its interests today. Since the founding of the secular republic in an Islamic land, Turkey allied itself with the West to modernize its country. For over seven decades, Turkey has remained loyal to Western interests. As a NATO member, Turkey is a pillar of the West, bordering Central Asia and the Caucasus.

It is the only Eastern country that is a member of all European institutions: NATO, the Council of Europe, and the OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Since 1952, Turkey has been tied to the West by the Atlantic Pact. Bordering Greece, its rival neighbor, it provides NATO with airbases and interception centers in a highly sensitive area, located between Africa and Asia. Since the fall of communism, Turkey has remained loyal to this pact, as evidenced by its military relations. Turkey served as a bridgehead for Western intervention during the Gulf War in 1991. Since then, Anglo Saxon aircraft have remained stationed at Incirlik for surveillance over Iraq.

According to NATO military experts, Turkey appeared, from the beginning of the East-West confrontation, as a reservoir of strategic potential. Blocking the Straits and isolating the Black Sea from the Mediterranean, intervening in the underbelly of Eastern countries, protecting the Middle East and its oil resources, and maintaining a renowned inter-army force were among the strategic advantages considered for Turkey, thanks to material support from the United States.

In return, Greece joined NATO in 1952 and plays a key role in the defense of the Eastern Mediterranean, also hosting several NATO bases under an agreement signed in 1976. Despite occasional disagreements, such as the dispute over the location of a regional headquarters, both countries coexist and cooperate within this organization. In 2000, for the first time, Greek and Turkish units participated in NATO organized exercises in both countries, which occurred without incident. In April, a Greek ship took part in naval maneuvers off the Turkish coast. In mid May, the Turkish army participated in exercises on the western coast of the Peloponnese, with 12 F16 fighter jets and 150 soldiers.

2. Alliance with Europe:

The lifting of Greece's veto on Turkey's candidacy for EU membership could be a stabilizing factor in their relations.

Turkey, influenced by its European territory and imperial past, and inspired by Mustafa Kemal’s vision, sought closer ties with the West. Since the first economic agreement with the EEC in 1963, which granted Turkey associate membership, numerous investments have been facilitated between the EU and Turkey. In 1987, Turkey officially submitted its EU membership application. President Özal aimed to use this alignment to accelerate Turkey’s economic and democratic development. By securing Cyprus’ accession to the EU and leveraging economic pressures, the EU successfully removed the Greek veto. Ankara must now meet economic, political, and human rights requirements to advance its membership bid.

Meanwhile, Greece officially applied for EEC membership on June 12, 1975, and became the 12th member in 1981. Greece has since benefited from considerable financial transfers. Through its EU membership, Greece gained a privileged status in the volatile Balkan region.

The Helsinki Summit of December 10 11, 1999, effectively redefined the EU's borders, as Turkey became a part of European geography with its candidate status. Turkey’s potential role in future power dynamics and the lifting of the Greek veto indicates a strategic shift.

3-Bilateral Cooperation:

Bilateral cooperation between Greece and Turkey was initiated by the climate of solidarity created during the earthquakes, reinforced by economic agreements.

Indeed, the dynamics of Greek Turkish détente are often attributed to the two foreign ministers, Mr. Papandreou and Ismail Cem. The two visits, one by the former to Ankara and the other by the latter to Athens in early 2000, strengthened this impression as they led to the signing of a series of bilateral agreements. However, subsequent steps will depend more on structural factors than on the personalities in power. Mr. Papandreou also stated that the rapprochement between Greece and Turkey began before the earthquake through discreet diplomacy, in an interview with the Turkish newspaper Hurriyet, specifying that Greek-Turkish disputes could be resolved based on international law and through recourse to the International Court of Justice in The Hague. The government spokesperson, Dimitris Reppas, when asked about the state of Greek Turkish relations, expressed that they are marked by a climate of non aggression. Mr. Reppas expressed a desire for a European Turkey rather than a Turkey that wants a  menu style  Europe, he concluded.

In the past, there were indeed Greeks who traveled to Turkey for a few days of vacation. However, Turks much more rarely chose Greece as a travel destination. Recently, the situation has completely changed, with Turkish tourists increasingly requesting tours in Greece from their travel agencies. According to tourism professionals, the number of Turks on organized trips to northern Greece has doubled. In travel agencies in Istanbul and Ankara, over 600 people per day are asking to consult brochures about Greece. In March 2000, which offered ten days off, over 15,000 Turkish tourists visited Greece. Currently, the main problem for a Turkish tourist wishing to travel to Greece is obtaining a visa due to the complicated procedures necessitated by the Schengen agreements. This change seems to result from the political and economic rapprochement between Greece and Turkey, as well as the climate of solidarity that emerged between the two peoples during the earthquakes that struck both countries in 1999.

These earthquakes triggered a reciprocal solidarity. Then, in December, there was the Helsinki summit and the lifting of the Greek veto on Turkey's candidacy for the European Union. This was a matter skillfully negotiated by Greek Prime Minister Kostas Simitis, who received assurance from his partners that Cyprus would finally see its membership request ratified without waiting for the resolution of its national dilemma. This step is crucial; Greece and Turkey were finally emerging from a deadlock in their relations that risked lasting indefinitely. In the Greek capital, where distrust is still the norm regarding the hereditary enemy, public opinion agrees that a new climate has been established in Greek-Turkish relations. A détente that the governments seem determined to cultivate.

The recipe is simple: avoid discussing the major issues that, not long ago, brought the two countries to the brink of armed conflict. The détente policy initiated between Athens and Ankara can be considered encouraging, albeit without betting on quick successes. Moreover, a cautious rapprochement may yield more stable results than an exuberant momentum that generates illusions. In the current phase, it is crucial on both sides to solidly establish the new direction and give it a realistic perspective. Four elements can particularly contribute to this:

1.     Firstly, both parties focus on subjects of common and non-conflictual interest. Hence, the series of agreements on environmental protection, tourism, and technological cooperation, which increase the possibilities for exchanges.

2.     Secondly, the relations between civil societies, previously hindered, are now benefiting from encouragement from the authorities. Many non-governmental organizations are involved in this cooperation on both sides. In this context, contacts between Greeks and Turks are also multiplying, facilitated by the development of tourism.

3.     Thirdly, the earthquakes have changed the attitude of the major media, fostering a sense of mutual solidarity between the two peoples.

4.     Fourthly, Greek Turkish relations are developing on an economic basis. Businesspeople are among the active proponents of détente, but their initiatives have until now depended on the whims of the political situation. Since the Helsinki summit, cooperation has intensified and broadened on a regional level. Turkish partners view Greece as a springboard into the Balkans, while Greeks hope, through their Turkish partners, to access the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Thus, the rapprochement between Ankara and Athens has led to promising multifaceted bilateral cooperation, but it is still hindered by the mistrust that reflects the heavy historical legacy of conflict weighing on their relationship.

II- HEREDITARY ANIMOSITY:

The historical conflictual legacy between Turkey and Greece significantly strains their relations. Their antagonism dates back to their respective independence, compounded by the Cyprus issue and the situation of marginalized minorities; these factors can quickly escalate into a crisis between the two countries.

21- Aftermath of a Turbulent History:

The conflicts that have succeeded one another throughout history between Turkey and Greece continue to weigh heavily on their relations.

Indeed, during World War I, the Ottoman Empire, which made the poor choice to ally with Germany, was nearing its collapse. During this period, nationalists of all origins, encouraged by Western powers and Russia, began to dream of independence, particularly the Greeks, who envisioned the  Megali Idea  of a Greece encompassing most of Anatolia, claiming that Greeks had inhabited the region since antiquity. A propaganda campaign was launched to demonstrate that the Turks were the hereditary enemies of Greek civilization.

Greece then fought alongside the Allies, who had promised to grant it a portion of Turkey. In 1919, Greece indeed gained control of the Dodecanese archipelago from Turkey and occupied the city of Smyrna  modern day Izmir on the Turkish mainland, which housed a significant Greek community. Over the following years, Greek politicians advocated for the expansion of Greece and claimed all territories with a substantial Greek population to unite them within a vast state with its capital in the ancient Byzantine city of Constantinople. Naturally, the Turks opposed this policy, which involved the annexation of part of their territory. To achieve its goal, Greece attacked Turkey in 1921 but suffered a humiliating defeat. In 1922, the Turks managed to retake Smyrna, during which the Greek community was decimated. The Treaty of Lausanne, signed in 1923, granted Turkey part of Thrace and all the territories in Asia Minor occupied by Greece. This agreement resulted in a significant population transfer: 1.3 million Greeks left Turkey, and 350,000 Turks left Greece.

During the Turkish War of Independence, Atatürk succeeded in resisting the demands of the Allies, expelled the occupying Greek, British, French, and Italian forces, and imposed an agreement realized by the Treaty of Lausanne.

Furthermore, since its independence, Greece has always felt uneasy regarding its neighbor and former occupying power, the Ottoman Empire, which later became Turkey. Several armed conflicts have opposed the two states, notably the 1920 1922 war, which ended with the Treaty of Lausanne and the exchange of Turkish and Greek populations. World War II then shifted the priorities of both countries, leading to tumultuous relations.

However, from the 1950s onward, Cyprus became the new bone of contention. The invasion of its northern part in 1974 and its occupation once again made Turkey appear as a potential military threat to Greece. The Turkish Fourth Army, which has significant landing capabilities, is deployed on the western coast of Turkey facing the Greek islands located in the eastern Aegean Sea, which represents a major source of concern for Greece.

22- Cyprus: The Bone of Contention

Cyprus, a strategic island in the Mediterranean, is considered the cornerstone of Greco-Turkish antagonism, especially after its division into two separate entities: North and South, respectively under Turkish and Greek influence.

Indeed, Cyprus is the third-largest island in the Mediterranean and, due to its geographical position, has always been the target of covetousness and conquerors. The transition from Turkish to British domination in 1878 strengthened the national movement, which peaked during the revolt of 1931 and the anti colonial struggle.

In 1955, Greek Cypriots began armed resistance against London. The United Kingdom refused to lose this dust of empire a few kilometers from the Middle East and the Suez Canal. It relied on the Turkish minority, which was less inclined to depend on Athens.

The coexistence of Greeks and Turks on the island was maintained until the 1950s by British colonization. Competition between the nationalisms only arose during the liberation struggles. In 1960, Cyprus became an independent republic according to the Zurich-London agreements.

At the conference held in London in January 1964, the then Turkish Foreign Minister revealed that Turkey had rights over Cyprus because the island was of great strategic importance to it. He described the island as geographically  the extension of the Anatolian peninsula, constituting a convenient base controlling the entire Eastern Mediterranean and also as a solid foothold behind Turkey's defensive system. He concluded that Cyprus was, for all these reasons, vital for Turkey, not only because of the presence of a Turkish community on the island but also due to its geostrategic position.

However, the coup d'état on July 15, 1974, against the legitimate Cypriot government, organized by the military junta in power in Athens, provided Turkey with the long-awaited pretext to invade the Republic of Cyprus on July 20 of the same year, violating the UN Charter and all principles governing international relations. Thus, 35,000 Turkish soldiers, equipped with modern weaponry and supported by aviation and naval forces, are stationed in the occupied area, making the island one of the most militarized regions in the world.

Turkey invaded the island and occupied 37% of the Cypriot territory, expelling the Greek Cypriot population that resided there and gathering all the Turkish Cypriots in the occupied northern part of the country, thus leading to the separation of the island into two zones: Turkish Cypriots in the north and Greek Cypriots in the south. Ultimately, in 1983, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was unilaterally declared but recognized only by Turkey and condemned by the international community.

As for the United States, they are in favor of the dual attachment: the north to Turkey and the south to Greece, thus turning the island into a bastion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO.

The resurgence of Turkey's claims on Cyprus is based on a Turkish Cypriot nationalism inspired and supported by Ankara in the 1950s and 1960s. On the other hand, the geographical and strategic position of the island facing Turkey's two military ports, Mersin and Iskenderun, constitutes a direct threat to Ankara's maritime policy, particularly its policy applied in the Middle East.

Moreover, Greek Cypriots have developed a military option that led to a missile crisis. Regardless of how the purchase of S-300 surface to air missiles from Russia is justified, it is clear that politically, Nicosia made a mistake by not taking into account the reaction of the great northern neighbor and its consequences for the European perspective. By threatening to prevent the deployment of the S 300s by military means, Ankara fully aligns with a foreign policy that had already dictated the invasion of Cyprus in 1974.

Ankara has repeatedly stated that it would do everything to prevent the establishment of the missile system if necessary by military means. The United States views the S 300s unfavorably. They fear that these could reach the global market due to their deployment in Cyprus, which would pose serious competition for the American Patriot system. Moreover, their radar system requires the presence of Russian specialists, who could provide Moscow with sensitive information about the eastern Mediterranean.

To calm the anxieties of the Greek Cypriots, the United States, the European Union, and NATO should at least compel Turkey to respect the Green Line of Cyprus at all costs. This would certainly not advance the political solution but would help alleviate the anxiety and, along with it, the missile crisis.

Despite the presence of blue helmets on the island and multiple condemnations of the Turkish military intervention by the United Nations, no solution is in sight. On the contrary, hopes for reunification are not closer. Nicosia, the capital, remains alongside Sarajevo as the last European city divided in two.

After the invasion, all parties involved have attempted, or pretended to seek a solution, including the two Cypriot communities and the three guarantor powers of the independence and integrity of the island United Kingdom, Greece, and Turkey. For the Greek Cypriots, the shock of the invasion has evolved mentalities. As early as 1975, they accepted the idea of a bi-communal federation between the two zones. Two agreements in this sense were ratified in 1977 and 1979. However, the two parties do not conceive of the federation in the same way. Greek Cypriots favor a strong central authority, while their Turkish counterparts want a confederation of two distinct state entities. To date, nothing has been able to bridge the divide.

Disappointed by the impotence of the UN, Greek Cypriots turned to Brussels, and in July 1990, they submitted a request for membership in the European Economic Community. In February 1994, the twelve appointed an observer, Mr. Serge Abou, to follow the intercommunal negotiations, but their divisions are evident. Greece, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Belgium, and Luxembourg are in favor of Cyprus joining the Union, even before a hypothetical reunification. The Netherlands raised objections, and the United Kingdom is resolutely opposed, as this membership would undermine the status of its military bases.

With its 9,000 km², the largest island in the Mediterranean after Sicily and Sardinia, Cyprus is like an aircraft carrier anchored in the Eastern Mediterranean, which has sparked the geopolitical appetites of Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. But with its 800,000 inhabitants, lacking oil or resources, it hardly mobilizes international institutions. This dichotomy has favored the diplomatic deadlock that has persisted since 1974, even since independence in 1960, and it remains the central piece of the interminable Greco-Turkish conflict.

23- The Minority Problem:

From the First World War to the present day, the situation of marginalized minorities constitutes another point of friction between Turkey and Greece.

Indeed, under the Treaty of Lausanne in July 1923, both countries committed to ensuring the protection of 200,000 Orthodox Christians in Istanbul and 120,000 Muslims in Western Thrace. Since this treaty, which rendered the Treaty of Sèvres void, a population exchange was decided. The Greeks in Anatolia who refused to be part of the new state were exchanged with some of the Turks residing in Greece. This ethnic cleansing is the result of an irresponsible nationalist policy. Currently, the Greeks who remained in Turkey are not mistreated, and the situation of Turks living in Western Thrace seems to be improving, but encouraging integration measures need to be implemented in practice to enhance the situation of both populations.

Neither Greece nor Turkey has fully respected their commitments. The Greek Orthodox population in Istanbul has dwindled to only 3,000 today. In Thrace, the Turkish population stagnates despite a high birth rate because local administrative difficulties encourage significant emigration to Turkey or Germany. The question of minorities is one of the concerns occupying the minds of the Council of Europe, where there is debate about how to translate Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights into practice. The treatment of minorities can be subject to geopolitical considerations. It is undeniable that such situations weaken minorities and make them dependent on imperatives and prescriptions that sometimes contradict humanitarian concerns. Both internally and externally, minorities can be used for political, nationalist, and expansionist aims. Furthermore, there is a risk that minorities may become the subject of the policies of neighboring states.

Thus, Cyprus is populated by two main communities: Greek and Turkish. Following the island's independence in 1960, the antagonism between the two populations intensified, and from that year onward, the gradual deterioration between the two communities later gave Ankara the opportunity to intervene on the island. This first change of borders in Europe since 1945 resulted in approximately 5,000 deaths, about 1,600 people missing, and 200,000 Greek Cypriots one-third of the total population being driven from the occupied northern part, while Turkish Cypriots living in the free regions were forced by their leaders to relocate to the occupied areas. Additionally, the  Attila Line  named after the code name Operation Attila given by Turkey for the military invasion of Cyprus  is a sealed divide that artificially separates the island and its people, hindering the free movement of Cypriots in their own country.

Moreover, the European Parliament criticized Turkey for continuing to violate human rights in the occupied part of Cyprus and urged it to withdraw its occupying troops from the island and to work in good faith to find a fair and viable solution to the Cypriot issue within the framework of the UN. This was emphasized in a resolution adopted on November 15, 2000, by the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Security, and Defense Policy, at the plenary assembly of the European Parliament on Turkey.

Furthermore, many Turkish and Greek citizens today are rediscovering their ethnic or national origins, particularly under the pressure of recent Balkan and Caucasian crises. It is still difficult to assess the potential developments of this phenomenon. While these citizens primarily identify with their countries, they could form pressure groups to influence the direction of their states' foreign policies.

Thus, the historical legacy explains why the Greek-Turkish antagonism still weighs on their relationship, compounded by their geostrategic conflict, which could escalate into an acute crisis in the region.

III - PERSISTENCE OF GEOSTRATEGIC DIVERGENCES:

Their disagreement over the Aegean Sea, as well as differences in their relationships with Balkan countries and the ambition of a future regional Turkish power, constitute factors that could trigger an explosive crisis between Greece and Turkey at any moment.

31) The Aegean Sea: A Contested Area:

The Aegean Sea, a strategic zone, forms a field of extreme complexity of conflicts between Turkey and Greece.

As neighboring countries of the Aegean Sea, Greece and Turkey have long been involved in a dispute regarding the delimitation of their maritime border. Their conflict over the sharing of territorial waters intertwines history and geography. About 20% of Greek territory, made up of numerous Hellenized islands, is located mostly close to the Turkish coast. Greece, intending to extend its territorial waters to 12 nautical miles, faces a flat refusal from Ankara: such appropriation could restrict its vessels’ access to Turkish ports. The controversy is the subject of scholarly discussions among jurists.

The Aegean Sea primarily represents an important maritime route for Greece toward large islands like Lesbos, Chios, or Rhodes, while for Turkey, it serves as part of the north-south axis connecting the Dardanelles to the Mediterranean, providing access to Izmir, the largest port in the Aegean Sea.

Moreover, Greece accuses Ankara of having enacted two national laws in November 1973 and July 1974, which extend Turkish jurisdiction over the continental shelf in such a way that it divides the Greek national entity in two. According to Greece, this situation, which it deems arbitrary, isolates nearly a hundred of the most populated Greek islands. Athens has brought this dispute before the International Court of Justice in The Hague, but the court declared itself incompetent, as it cannot be seized in isolation, and Ankara has no such request.

Turkey considers itself a geographically disadvantaged state due to its peninsular nature, surrounded on all sides by narrow and semi-closed seas. It is especially the Greek islands located very close to the Turkish coast, sitting on the Turkish continental shelf, that create a major source of friction between the two countries. Since 1975, the Turkish Fourth Army stationed on the coast has been provided with a landing fleet. In response, the Greeks have reinforced their military contingents on the islands near the official border.

On the other hand, the discovery of several oil fields in the Aegean Sea has triggered violent territorial conflicts between Greece and Turkey. The overlapping exclusive economic zones lead to periodic and frequent clashes between Turkish and Greek sailors. The economic stakes are significant, given the richness of the Aegean seabed, particularly in petroleum resources. If Athens strictly applies international maritime law, Ankara would find itself in a situation of dependence concerning its maritime trade routes, a situation deemed detrimental to national independence. The same issue resurfaces regarding the airspace surrounding each of the small islands. Each country interprets its right to fly differently, resulting in national airspaces that are far from being distinct. This frequently leads to violations of each other’s national territories in the third dimension.

Maritime borders are more complex; they must be delineated according to the principles set forth in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which came into force in November 1994 and has been ratified by Greece. Turkey’s refusal to sign and ratify it complicates negotiations between the two countries, which generally adhere to the principle of equidistance; however, this is merely a means to achieve equity, which remains the ultimate goal of any fair and balanced solution. This is no longer the case in the Aegean Sea, due to Greece’s historical national sovereignty over a multitude of islands close to the coast of Asia Minor, leaving Turkey with only a thin sub littoral maritime strip.

To examine the legal dimensions of this dispute more closely, we can say: Regarding territorial waters, the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which entered into force in November 1994, stipulates that each coastal state may extend its sovereignty zone up to 12 nautical miles. While this Greek claim is unbearable for Turkey, it is enough to look at the region’s map to understand. We can see that the Greek territorial waters, if extended to 12 miles, would eventually meet. The current north-south passage, now an international maritime route, would become a Greek strait. In this case, Turkey would be deprived of this essential strait, and the port of Izmir would be isolated from the Mediterranean. The major maritime powers of NATO would oppose such an enlargement because they also wish to retain a right of passage in the Aegean Sea.

Regarding air sovereignty, since 1931, the Greeks have claimed a sovereignty zone of 10 nautical miles in their airspace, applicable to all their islands. Ankara, however, only recognizes a zone of 6 miles, resulting in Turkish military aircraft regularly entering the disputed area of the remaining 4 miles, which Greek fighter jets, of course, try to prevent. Such interception maneuvers regularly lead to skirmishes that could one day result in actual damage.

Concerning the seabed, Athens and Ankara diverge on the delimitation of their respective economic zones. The Turkish side dreams of a median line that would allow it to exploit the seabed in the entire eastern half of the Aegean Sea excluding the sovereignty zones around the Greek islands. The Greeks do not intend to grant the Turks any drilling rights in the heart of the Aegean Sea, meaning behind their farthest eastern islands.

With these positions being irreconcilable, Greece has been proposing since 1976 to bring the matter before the International Court of Justice in The Hague, which has already rendered several judgments on this type of dispute, judgments that could set a precedent in the Greek Turkish legal conflict.

These Greek Turkish tensions linked to their maritime dispute in the Aegean Sea contribute to the instability of the Eastern Mediterranean, a region that is strategic for both the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union. As we can see, the conditions are ripe for the onset of a major crisis that has long been brewing and could explode at any moment.

32- Relations with the Balkan Countries:

Greece and Turkey occupy a particularly significant position in the Balkans, and their antagonism reflects on their respective relations with the countries in the region.

Indeed, with the turmoil shaking the Balkans and the emergence of nationalist conflicts, Turkey cannot ignore the presence of a Turkish origin community at its borders. Due to its geography and history  the Ottoman Empire dominated certain Balkan countries for five centuries and is largely responsible for the presence of the Turkish minority in this region, it is compelled to play a role in this area. It is indeed a Balkan power. The memories of its past, its European extension, its Turkish colonies scattered across the eastern Mediterranean peninsula, and its 10 million inhabitants who migrated from the Balkans to Turkey after World War II all demonstrate this.

The Turks in Bulgaria represent one in ten Bulgarians. This community has suffered various oppressions since World War I, the latest being the campaign of forced assimilation in 1984. Today, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, established in 1990, its Turkish electoral base, has about twenty deputies in parliament.

Albania has become the pivot of Turkish policy in the Balkans. Through its investments, Ankara contributes to assisting the poorest country in Europe and, at the same time, strengthens its economic positions in a territory rich in important mineral resources. The breakup of Yugoslavia allows Turkey to establish closer ties with Tirana: just weeks before its disappearance, President Turgut Özal visited Albania to consolidate the natural ties between the two countries and defend the rights of Muslims in Kosovo against Serbian encroachments.

Moreover, the Turks support the accession of the Serbian province of Kosovo to independence, or even its annexation to Albania. Greece, for its part, can only negotiate with Albania, where a Hellenic minority resides in Northern Epirus. It provides material aid to Tirana, hoping to counter Turkish penetration.

The authorities in Ankara closely monitor events unfolding in the former Yugoslavia. Bosnia and Herzegovina, with its 1.83 million Muslims, is the subject of particular Turkish concern. Their attention is also drawn to events in Macedonia and Kosovo. They are more inclined to organize cooperative actions and set up numerous development projects.

Facing their cumbersome neighbor, Greece and Bulgaria have drawn notably closer. In contrast, Yugoslavia, which had a dispute with Greece over Macedonia, maintained good relations with Turkey. A Belgrade Ankara axis thus emerged in response to an Athens-Sofia axis. This was reaffirmed during the Yugoslav crisis. In a meeting in September 1991, the Greek and Bulgarian prime ministers recalled the close friendship between Greece and Bulgaria and affirmed that the Athens-Sofia axis represented a factor of regional cooperation.

However, the rivalry between Ankara and Athens also manifests itself in the Macedonia issue. The independence of this republic from the former Yugoslavia not only poses an unacceptable naming problem for the Greeks. It could also strengthen Turkey's Muslim influence over Skopje. Under these conditions, Athens declares itself ready to recognize its independence but also, making the best of a bad situation, to guarantee its territorial integrity and provide economic assistance, on the condition that the new state renounces the name Macedonia. In the eyes of the Greek population, the term is too intimately tied to Hellenic history.

Furthermore, Athens fears the potential use that Ankara could make of the one hundred thousand Turks residing in Macedonia, associated with the Albanian origin Muslim minority. Skopje, Tirana, and Sarajevo could be stepping stones for Turkey's advance into central Europe.

Turkey's efforts to play an active role in the Balkan crisis, due to the Muslim minorities and Turkish-descendant minorities living there, lead Greece to believe that the goal of Turkish policy would be to create a green  or Islamic belt stretching from the Adriatic to the Black Sea, isolating Greece from Europe. Even if this is an exaggerated view of reality, it explains the aggressiveness of Greek diplomacy in the Balkans: hostility towards Macedonia and support for Serbia.

In the eyes of Greeks, whether politicians or specialists in international relations, the current or foreseeable geopolitical changes are a significant source of concern. On the one hand, to the east, the large Turkish neighbor will soon number around eighty million inhabitants, if not more. Turkey will then be, outside the United States, the most populous NATO nation and, undoubtedly, a very expanded European community. Stronger than Greece's population, how will the heir of the Ottoman Empire, with numerous disputes with Athens, behave? On the other hand, to the west, the disappearance of the former Yugoslavia and the emancipation of the peoples that Belgrade tried to unite, including around five million Islamized Slavs and Turks, raise fears of a dangerous encirclement for Greece.

In Athens, diplomats and military personnel are convinced that their country can be a factor for stability in the Balkans, an analysis not shared by many Western capitals, which instead fear a destabilizing role for Greece.

Indeed, according to Western countries, Greece is, after Romania, the main responsible for violating the embargo against Serbia. If the government does not participate directly, businessmen do not hesitate to. Moreover, Greece's uncompromising position regarding Macedonia and its refusal to recognize this state unless it changes its name is criticized. This veto hampers the development of Macedonia, sharpens inter ethnic tensions, and delays democratic transition there. The implosion of this country could mean the extension of war throughout the Balkans.

As a result, Greece supports Bulgaria against Turkey, but against Macedonia, it backs Belgrade. Turkey, for its part, immediately recognized Macedonia's independence and has also sought to build closer ties with Albania. However, Ankara's strong ties with Skopje and Tirana raise concerns about encircling Greece. In response to this threat, Mr. Papandreou seeks to adjust his security policy. In his program presented on October 23, 1993, before Parliament, he stated: The national defense policy is based on the unity of the Hellenic space. Our strategic orientation is founded on the fact that the main threat comes from the East.

33- Turkey's Regional Ambition:

After the fall of the communist bloc, Turkey became aware of its relatively diminishing importance in the eyes of its Western allies. Its aspiration for EU membership led it to better cooperate with its neighbors and develop a regional power ambition.

Indeed, the development of the Turkish economy and the collapse of the Soviet Union coincided with a revival of cooperation with neighboring countries in the Black Sea, the Caucasus, and the Turkic republics in Asia. As a regional power, Turkey aspires to be a crossroads between Europe, the Black Sea, the Middle East, and Asia, and its diplomacy moves in this direction.

In reality, Mr. Erbakan, while Prime Minister, embarked on official trips to his eastern neighbors. These trips aimed to renew economic relations rather than conspire against the West. Aware of the drop in its strategic interest since the disintegration of the USSR, Turkey is trying to avoid dependence on Western countries. To do this, it is turning towards its geopolitical environment. With Iran, it concluded an agreement to construct a $23 billion gas pipeline between the two countries. Through this intelligently negotiated contract with Iran on favorable terms for Turkey, it succeeded in diversifying its energy supply sources and reducing its dependence. With Iraq and Syria, as part of the Southeastern Anatolia Project, it signed agreements to guarantee annual flows of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers.

Following the collapse of the USSR and the emergence of new republics, Turkey conducts a coherent regional diplomacy to take advantage of the many resources present in Central Asia and to establish itself as a new model in the region. It is worth noting that the energy dossier is of vital importance, given that Turkey has no hydrocarbon resources in its territory. Thus, it has a strong interest in getting heavily involved in the exploitation, commercialization, and transport of energy sources from the Caspian Sea, namely oil from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and natural gas from Turkmenistan. Therefore, for the exploitation of oil in the Caspian Sea, the consortium prioritized a Turkish route to the west, passing through the Georgian port of Batumi. Such an opportunity should bring a financial windfall in terms of royalties. Undoubtedly, this final choice constitutes a political and economic victory for Turkey in the tug of war against Russia. Ankara, on the other hand, seeks by all means to strengthen the ties it is weaving with the Turkic republics, especially those that border the Caspian Sea.

Likewise, Ankara has managed to develop wise diplomatic relations with both Romania and Bulgaria, further isolating Greece against neighbors dissatisfied with its Balkan positions.

From a geopolitical perspective, it is essential to note that the affirmation of Turkish foreign policy is primarily directed towards its immediate surroundings, especially for vital economic reasons. Turkey remains anchored in the Western model. The main fact is the role Ankara wishes to play in the region by asserting itself as an indispensable power. In this aspiration, it clashes with Russia, and the position of the West will be decisive, as they are eager to diminish Russia's geostrategic space and isolate it even further.

Through its ambitions in the Caucasus and Central Asia, its projects for a Common Market in the Black Sea, its re emergence in the Balkans, and its liberation from the Russian threat, Turkey is abandoning a defensive foreign policy for an active regional policy. The European Union is also worried, seeking, as noted by a British journalist, an increasing determination among the fifteen to elevate their relationship with Turkey in recognition of its growing role. The country could thus advance its files with Brussels while becoming the main channel of cooperation with Central Asian countries. This role of catalyst between Europe and the countries bordering the Black Sea, the Caucasus, and Asia prepares for the extension of Europe.

CONCLUSION:

In summary, as NATO members under the tutelage of the United States, Turkey and Greece fully cooperate within this organization. Strategic bases are established on their territories, allowing for control over the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and even Central Asia.

Thus, Greece has renounced the veto it had maintained for years against Turkey's candidacy for European Union membership, which is now open. This initiative for rapprochement was propelled by the climate of solidarity triggered by the earthquakes experienced by both the Greek and Turkish populations.

The dynamics of détente are often attributed to the two foreign ministers, Mr. Papandreou and Ismail Cem. Their exchange of visits to Ankara and Athens at the beginning of 2000 led to the signing of a series of bilateral agreements. While a rapprochement has occurred between Turks and Greeks due to the disasters they faced almost simultaneously, it remains true that improving their relationship requires political will from both states.

However, the disputes between Turkey and Greece persist regarding the delimitation of their maritime border in the Aegean Sea, particularly concerning the islands that impact the exploitation of marine resources with the enforcement of the twelve mile rule. The tension between the two countries remains a powder keg. Greece remains convinced that the Turks are implementing a gradual strategy of reconquest at its expense.

Furthermore, Cyprus remains the focal point around which the Greco-Turkish antagonism revolves. It must be acknowledged that the stakes are high, given its proximity to the Anatolian coast, which could jeopardize Turkey's maritime strategy in the Near East.

A characteristic feature of Turkish foreign policy is a reorientation of its efforts and a geographical diversification, directed both towards the West and the East. In fact, this policy aims to re establish economic relations rather than conspire against the West, its original model. Aware of the decline in its strategic interest since the disintegration of the USSR, Turkey is trying to avoid dependence on Western countries. To achieve this, it is turning towards its natural geopolitical environment, which includes the Balkans and the East.

However, historical enmity has developed a certain mistrust between Greece and Turkey. Together, they possess more tanks than the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy combined. They allocate 3.8% and 4.7% of their GDP to defense, respectively, compared to an average of 2.2% for other NATO member countries.

Due to this instability and reliance on high military spending, the Greco-Turkish warming could fail to yield the expected results despite the work of joint expert commissions and diplomats stationed in Ankara and Athens. The main strategic issues of contention are not yet resolved, and rapprochement may not be imminent.

The integration of Turkey into the European Union requires, first and foremost, meeting the Copenhagen criteria. This paradox may only be resolved in the long term, and if achieved, the Greco-Turkish disputes could ultimately emerge from the deadlock.