The Russian Federation

As a result, alternative governments have emerged but have been unable to pull the country out of this economic and political crisis, proving that these reforms have only led to contrasting outcomes, resulting in a crisis of power. Faced with this array of contrasts, it becomes evident to ask the question: 

Who holds power in Russia?

Russia is currently in a paradox. It has learned to live with a sick president whose power is strong despite his political blunders and erratic behavior. Disorganized political institutions preside over a power vacuum that has become a game between a minority of powerful groups consisting of elites from financial and industrial consortiums who dominate the political and economic scene, able to buy ministers and even the president of their choice.

Before highlighting the preeminence of financial and industrial groups in decision-making, it is necessary to show the shortcomings of presidential power and then those of political institutions.

PRESIDENTIAL POWER
Since his rise to power in 1991, Boris Yeltsin succeeded in adopting new constitutional laws, giving more power to the president and advocating a policy of reforms, supported by his supporters and the West. However, his deteriorating health and political blunders led him into an unprecedented political lethargy and contributed to his declining popularity.

In fact, Boris Yeltsin sought to replace the constitution inherited from the Brezhnev era with a new one, granting him extensive powers, thus establishing a distinctly presidential regime that allowed him to govern the country by decree. He reserved the right to intervene directly in government affairs. In addition to being the head of the armed forces, he notably controlled the nuclear button and directed foreign policy. Moreover, he eliminated opposition by decreeing the dissolution of the Council of People's Deputies on September 23, 1993, in order to continue political and economic reforms without hindrance. Furthermore, Western nations continued to show their support for Boris Yeltsin by granting record funds and subsidies through the IMF and the World Bank. They believed that his retention in the Kremlin was preferable to a possible return of the communists. This enabled Russia to become the USSR's heir in the UN Security Council and to join the Council of Europe.

Despite all these presidential advantages, he was accused of leading the federation towards disintegration, having abandoned the 20 million Russians who remained in the former Soviet republics. His unnecessary intervention in Chechnya isolated him further, causing him to lose the support of democrats and many Russians, and the image of a democrat he once enjoyed in the West faded. Moreover, his health continued to decline due to heart surgeries, including quintuple coronary bypass surgery, forcing him to govern the country only in increasingly rare spurts. This prevented him from following internal and external developments closely. He only appeared to dismiss his two prime ministers, Viktor Chernomyrdin and Sergei Kirienko, and a few members of his inner circle.

It thus becomes clear that the Russian president clings to a power he no longer exercises. Despite his efforts to implement political and economic reforms in the country, political institutions still suffer from a lack of democracy.

INSTITUTIONAL POWER
Classical democracy still reigns in Russia, but the lack of organized political parties and the apparent altruism of regional leaders contribute to an alarming political vacuum and regional disparity. Indeed, the most persistent obstacle to democracy in Russia, which could lead to a dangerous power vacuum, is the absence of true political parties. Deputies behave as pressure groups, which have become numerous, such as:
• The military-industrial complex
• The agrarian group
• The raw materials lobby
• The financiers' lobby.

These pressure groups force political parties to let their deputies vote freely for fear of the party’s collapse, leaving the Duma constantly struggling to find its place on the political scene. The Duma remains handicapped, on the one hand, by its disorganization due to a lack of experts and infrastructure, and on the other hand, by the anti-parliamentary atmosphere fostered by the president and the media. Additionally, the population, increasingly pessimistic and distrustful, is more attracted to apolitical candidates such as managers and traditional figures, as confirmed by the results of recent elections:
• 23% of the votes for the Liberal Democratic Party
• 15% of the votes for the nationalists
• 12% for the communists
• 08% for the reformers
• 06% for the Unity and Accord Party
• 08 seats for the Democratic Reforms Movement.

Moreover, the second representative chamber, the Federation Council of Russia, consists of the executive head and the legislative head of the 89 subjects (regions). It was initially conceived as the voice of the regions but has now become the arena where regional support is negotiated, through political concessions and economic freedoms. This has led to contradictory laws and regulations, sometimes violating the constitution, and has created significant disparities between the regions of the federation.

Consequently, the two representative chambers of the Russian people have become less credible and ineffective in decision-making, leaving the financial and industrial groups free to take control of the political and economic life of the country.

FINANCIERS' AND INDUSTRIALISTS' LOBBIES
Russia’s forced transition to a market economy gave rise to financial and industrial groups that managed to infiltrate the government and control the economy. In fact, these groups of financiers and industrialists literally bought Boris Yeltsin’s victory in the 1996 presidential elections, which allowed them to take over the government and seize various key positions, such as the Russian Security Council (Berezovsky), the Ministry of Economy (Vladimir Potanin), control of reforms (Anatoly Chubais), and the supervision of privatizations (Alfred Kokh). The latter were encouraged by the presidency and preferred to be carried out by nationals, as foreigners did not care about the social and political consequences of these privatizations.

They then became the main creditors of the state, which turned to them to pay its civil servants' salary arrears, in exchange for shares in state companies. This allowed them to monopolize key state properties, breaking the old economic system while enriching themselves at the expense of the general population, which lives in a disastrous situation. They have also become the arbiters of the conflict between reformers and communists, funding municipal and regional election campaigns and using the media, in which they have heavily invested, to maintain a climate of consensus in their favor. They presented their victory as that of all of Russia. These groups have also become essential components of foreign policy, as foreign delegations now include more businessmen than diplomats, and the economy, national interests, and national security are intertwined. A significant example is the Caspian Sea oil stakes.

Finally, to understand the dominance of these groups over the economy, one must systematically link it to their close connection with mafia networks, which control 40% of the GDP through 40,000 companies and 600 banks under their direction. Their turnover amounts to Russia's debts for 1999.

On the other hand, the liberalization of the Russian economy has allowed the hegemony of vast fortunes over the circle of power and facilitated the spread of corruption by putting state properties at the mercy of criminalized privatization.

Thus, this period of transition has forced different forces in Russia, and the lines of demarcation have become blurred, leading to a dangerous drift with corrupt electoral campaigns and power in the hands of a few pressure groups fighting to impose their ideologies and preserve their interests without considering the society, which seems bewildered and even disillusioned.

In any case, Russian democracy must rely on numerous social, cultural, and political institutions that include credible opposition, along with a widespread political culture that allows mass participation in political life, so the country can avoid the abyss toward which it seems to be heading.