THE MISSILE CRISIS ( PART ONE)

 INTRODUCTION:

With the dawn of a new world order promising peace, stability, and progress for humanity, the 20th century ends rather with a "happy ending," reminiscent of the finest Hollywood plots. However, one cannot forget that its course has been marked by unspeakable scenes of human carnage, ruins, and desolation, which have highlighted the animalistic dimension of homo sapiens. Thus, barely emerging from the atrocities and the disaster caused by two wars that, in the span of two decades, involved all the peoples of the earth, the world once again found itself plunged into a zone of turbulence where humanity’s destructive ingenuity would once again threaten its very existence. The collapse of the Axis powers and the exhaustion of Europe left the two great victors of the war face to face: the United States and the USSR. England, which certainly contributed significantly to the victory, is but a shadow of its former self and must cede its global responsibilities to America. France, liberated but drained, must focus on its reconstruction and the reconstitution of its colonial empire. China, exhausted by seven years of war and Japanese occupation, is on the brink of civil war. For a time, there is hope that the two "Giants" will come together to reorganize the world. However, the necessity to fight a common enemy having vanished, the coalition quickly disintegrates, unleashing forces that will immediately clash in various hot spots around the globe. This results in a long period of latent conflict, punctuated by a few violent crises at the periphery, through client states, with the exception of direct and widespread confrontation between the two superpowers—a period known as the "Cold War." Born from the disagreements between Russians and Westerners regarding the German question, this new world war initially has an acute phase between 1947 and 1953 before continuing in a subdued form until the resurgence of tensions observed in August 1961, with the construction of the Berlin Wall and the outbreak of the Cuban crisis in the autumn of 1962. According to almost unanimous expert opinion, the latter brought international relations to a level of tension rarely reached, with the world suddenly believing it was on the brink of nuclear war. Short-lived, with uncertain outcomes, the Cuban missile crisis unfolded according to the rules of a classic tragedy. On October 22, the crisis erupted openly when President Kennedy, in a dramatic speech to his fellow citizens, revealed the construction of Soviet nuclear missile bases in Cuba and announced a blockade of the island while demanding the dismantling of the sites from the USSR. In Moscow and Havana, the reactions were fierce and vigorous. While nineteen ships of the Second American Fleet had established an arc within 800 kilometers around Cuba by 10:00 AM on October 24, it was learned that twenty-five Soviet vessels were heading towards Cuba; we were then on the verge of a major incident, especially since American strategic forces and conventional Soviet forces had been put on alert. The confrontation was only avoided when Khrushchev ordered the Soviet ships to turn back on October 26. The crisis quickly calmed down by the 28th with the acceptance of the dismantling of the Soviet missile installations after a compromise was reached between the Americans and the Russians. Beyond its dramatic dimension, it is noteworthy that many analysts argue that only the Cuban crisis, due to its intensity and the direct confrontation it characterized, could provoke a profound transformation in international relations. We are thus justified in asking how this crisis represents a turning point in East-West relations during the Cold War.
Although it takes place in the continuation of the Cold War and does not mark its end, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 nonetheless signifies an irreversible turning point in East-West relations, inaugurating a new era of détente characterized by a renewed constructive dialogue between Americans and Soviets, a relaxation of discipline within the blocs, and paradoxically, the survival of certain peripheral conflicts.
Exploring the origins of the crisis first, to better grasp the extent of the change, highlighting the most characteristic aspects of the era of détente in an evolutionary perspective to appreciate the symbolic value of each step taken, and finally examining certain corollary phenomena that, rather than diminishing the resonance of the process, facilitate the mastery of all its contours, will certainly allow us to understand the historical significance of the Cuban missile crisis and draw lessons from it.

() Kennedy’s speech caused great shock and sporadic waves of panic among the American populace. A Gallup poll conducted the next day shows that for more than one in five Americans, the blockade would trigger World War III.
() This was the only time in its existence that the Strategic Air Command (SAC) was placed on Defense Condition 2, which meant, among other things, the alert of 172 missiles, 1200 bombers, 90 Atlas, and 46 Titans, with a destructive power exceeding 6000 megatons.
(*) However, some authors argue that the Cuban crisis is far too exceptional to draw relevant lessons for other cases. "We must ask ourselves whether the uniqueness of the crisis does not destroy its value as an archetype or worse, make it a profoundly misleading subject for reflection." Cohen, Eliot A. "Why We should stop studying the Cuban crisis," The National Interest, winter 1986, No. 2, p. 5.

PART ONE: THE ORIGINS OF THE MISSILE CRISIS

Deeply rooted in the turmoil of U.S.-Cuban relations since the revolution of the "barbudos" in 1959, the Cuban missile crisis was made possible only with the temerity of the Soviet number one, Khrushchev; the strategic and ideological stakes it raises, particularly concerning the direct threat to American territory and the prospect of Latin America being contaminated by the virus of "Castroism," represent aggravating factors.

11- The Tension in U.S.-Cuba Relations:
Considered privileged since the Monroe Doctrine of December 2, 1829, U.S.-Cuba relations would quickly deteriorate from 1959 onwards, exacerbated by the social and economic reforms undertaken by Fidel Castro and the intransigence of American leaders whose incessant attempts to destabilize the Cuban regime would contribute to the rapprochement between Havana and Moscow.
Indeed, due to its geostrategic position as an island dominating the Gulf of Mexico and located off the coast of Florida, Cuba has long sparked keen interest among Americans. In this regard, the Monroe Doctrine signified both the opposition of the United States to European imperialism and the assertion of an American hegemonic desire by considering Cuba as an exclusive sphere of influence. Therefore, after the withdrawal of the Spanish from the island and its accession to independence following the Treaty of Paris on December 22, 1898, the U.S. Congress imposed the "Platt Amendment," whereby the Cuban government had to obtain approval for its military or diplomatic agreements from the United States.
It is also why they obtained the concession to install two naval bases in exchange for preferential tariffs on Cuban products entering the American market. Additionally, it should be noted that on the eve of the Cuban revolution in 1959, American companies controlled a significant portion of sugar cane plantations, mineral resources, and the tertiary sector on the island, where, moreover, Americans indulged in rampant tourism.
However, the shock of the Cuban revolution would give a different turn to the relations between the United States and Cuba. In fact, the triumph of the rebel army and the entry of the "barbudos" into Havana on January 1, 1959, significantly fueled third-world ideology, stimulated revolutionary fervor, and gave rise to a true mythology; all these factors would incite initial distrust and subsequently hostility from Americans. Thus, acclaimed by the people of Havana, where he entered triumphantly on January 8, Fidel Castro proclaimed on the 21st that Cuba had become a free and independent country. The liberal government of Cardona, successor to Batista, who had fled to Florida, ceded power to him on February 13. Despite the assurances he gave to his interlocutors during his first official visit to the United States and Canada in April, asserting, "In any case, we are not communists," Fidel Castro nevertheless accelerated the revolutionary process.
By March 10, he ordered a 50% reduction in rental prices on the island and passed the first agrarian reform law on May 17. Between June and August 1960, the main American companies were nationalized. A decisive step was taken with the nationalization laws of October of that year, which targeted the last American companies as well as all banks and large Cuban corporations; large land ownership was also abolished. Meanwhile, Americans had reacted by deciding on an embargo against Cuban sugar. The rupture was practically consummated when on January 3, 1961, Washington severed diplomatic relations with Havana.
More serious was the decision of the new President J.F. Kennedy to endorse the project prepared during his predecessor Eisenhower’s term for the landing of Cuban exiles trained in Guatemala under the supervision of the CIA on the island. Unfortunately for Americans, the Bay of Pigs invasion, which began with the bombardment of Cuban airports on April 15 by eight B-26 bombers that had departed from Nicaragua with Cuban crews, quickly turned into a disaster. The "Brigade 2506," commanded by a certain José San Roman and consisting of about 1400 men, was routed as soon as it landed by the Cuban loyalist forces.
This event is, of course, decisive for the subsequent history of Cuba in that it leads directly to the missile crisis. While President Kennedy must bear the responsibility for this failure with his legendary phrase, "victory has a hundred fathers, defeat is an orphan," the Cuban leader gains popularity and proclaims the socialist character of the Cuban revolution on April 16. Moreover, after having survived two assassination attempts, tested by a series of destabilization operations, and fearing a new American attack, Fidel Castro resolutely turns to Moscow, where it was considered as of April 22 that the victory of the bearded one of Havana was also that of N. Khrushchev.

12. Khrushchev's Gamble

Trapped in a triple deadlock—first, facing internal opposition against the "revisionism" of Stalin's policies and a strategically unfavorable posture; secondly, dealing with the German question concerning the status of Berlin; and finally, the fate of the Cuban regime in the face of American imperialist ambitions—Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet leader, seemed doomed to seek a spectacular success to salvage the situation. The installation of missiles in Cuba was thus considered to simultaneously and almost miraculously address this trilogy.

In fact, the end of 1961 and the beginning of 1962 were marked by challenges to Khrushchev's authority within his country, already heavily undermined by sharp criticisms from the Albanian party's first secretary, Enver Hoxha, and Chinese officials lamenting the loss of prestige of the Eastern bloc. The hardliners within the Communist Party, led by Molotov, were outraged by Khrushchev's "revisionism," accusing him of abandoning certain dogmas of Marxism-Leninism, starting with the dictatorship of the proletariat. While a fierce controversy erupted between the two largest Communist parties in the diaspora—the Italian and French—it became imperative for Khrushchev to regain control of the vast empire that Stalin had managed to unify.

Strategically, the USSR seemed to have gained an edge over the United States with the announcement on August 29, 1957, of the first test launch of a ballistic missile, leaving Western observers incredulous. Subsequently, Soviet leaders emphasized missile development since Americans had a significant advantage in intercontinental bombers. However, the myth of Soviet technological superiority, carefully maintained in Khrushchev's speeches, collapsed with the Eisenhower administration's launch of a vast intercontinental missile program, with the first models (Thor and Jupiter) ready to be deployed in England, Italy, and Turkey.

By the spring of 1961, the Soviets realized they had been outpaced by the Americans in both the quality and quantity of missiles. The American threat could not be countered by regional missiles or defensive strategic forces. Only a new generation of ICBMs could counter it. However, the SS-7 and SS-8 rockets, which could not be deployed until 1962-1963, had only mediocre accuracy, and their high vulnerability rendered them inadequate against American "Minutemen." More seriously for the USSR, much like today’s "missile shield," the Americans were not about to be deterred from their military efforts by hypothetical promises of disarmament.

The announcement of the resumption of nuclear tests by Washington if the Geneva Conference, which opened on March 15, 1962, did not achieve satisfactory results dashed Soviet hopes of curbing the arms race. This meant that the USSR, whose economy was too weak, would have to abandon its efforts to achieve strategic parity with the United States, pretending to catch up with the American standard of living, as Khrushchev had boasted at the XXII Congress. This contradiction between the domestic program and the international ambitions of the first secretary of the CPSU became evident at a moment when the former not only collided with the structural constraints of the Soviet economy but the latter also faced the stubborn resistance of the West regarding Germany.

This indicates that the Soviet decision to deploy missiles in Cuba was largely driven by the German question. Already, on November 10, 1958, Khrushchev had declared that the USSR was determined to end Western occupation of West Berlin and was ready to unilaterally renounce its obligations under the Potsdam agreements if the West refused to negotiate the end of the occupation regime in Germany and Berlin. On the 27th, a note was sent to Western powers giving them a six-month deadline to achieve this and transform West Berlin into an independent, free, and demilitarized political entity. In the event of refusal, the USSR would sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany, rendering the status of the former capital void. Thus, the goal of Soviet diplomacy was clear and consistent: to establish the status quo resulting from the war, thus freezing Germany's status within its borders, its division, and its armament. Moreover, the isolation of the former capital of the Reich, its military vulnerability, and its status as a permanent source of tension, a "symbol of the Cold War," made it once again the point of confrontation required. The construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 actually reflected the Kremlin's impatience with what it saw as the incomprehensible apathy of the West.

As all attempts at negotiation stalled, Khrushchev had to face the facts: if he renounced the treaty, he would lose face; if he resorted to it, it could serve as a pretext for the nuclear armament of West Germany or for the United States to settle accounts with Cuba. In fact, the survival of Castro's regime constituted the new challenge for Kremlin policy. Since Cuba was recognized as "socialist" on May 1, 1962, it implied "Soviet protection." Following the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, President Kennedy had tasked General Maxwell Taylor, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with studying the conditions under which a new operation could be attempted and the means that should be employed. Although it was only a working hypothesis, the USSR regarded it as a project and reacted by announcing that an American threat against Cuba would provoke a Soviet threat against a U.S. ally.

Khrushchev had already stated on July 9, 1960: "It would be good not to forget that the United States is no longer at an unreachable distance from the Soviet Union. If necessary, Soviet gunners can support the Cuban people with their missiles." Three days later, he declared again: "The greatest power in the world is with Cuba." Thus, the conduct of significant American maneuvers in the Caribbean with 7,500 "marines," 4 aircraft carriers, 20 destroyers, and 15 landing ships was seen in Havana and Moscow as preparation for an offensive.

In sum, the decision to install missiles in Cuba carried multiple stakes for Khrushchev. With this maneuver, Cuba would be sanctified, and there would be no more worries about the survival of the Castro regime. As for the strategic balance, it would be restored at little cost by temporarily avoiding the need for an arsenal of intercontinental missiles. Finally, by substituting Cuba for Berlin on the diplomatic chessboard, a dangerously blocked game would be reopened, providing new maneuvering possibilities to obtain a resolution of the German question that had continuously eluded resolution. However, the installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba, a small island pursuing a great power policy and which had constituted since 1959 the "main fixation abscess" in Latin America, also posed real or supposed stakes for Americans, leading to the dramatic turn of events.

13. Security, Strategic, and Ideological Stakes

For Americans, the fear of living under the direct threat of Soviet missiles stationed in Cuba was as unbearable as the risk of losing strategic nuclear parity and the insurrectional spread to other Latin American countries following the Cuban model.

In reality, saying that security concerns hold a predominant place in American policy is merely stating the obvious. Therefore, every effort was made to sanctify U.S. territory by keeping it out of reach of ballistic missiles from any source—this justifies the missile defense shield project—and safeguarding it from any terrorist action on the other hand.

Certainly, from the years 1957-1958 onwards, it was evident that the USSR possessed launchers capable of carrying nuclear warheads into U.S. territory; however, this threat was only vaguely and remotely perceived. By deciding to install Soviet missile bases in Cuba, Khrushchev brought the danger to within 150 kilometers of Florida's coast, thereby threatening a large part of both the U.S. territory and Latin America.

It should be noted that this apprehension was clearly articulated in the statements of the U.S. president following the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, when he declared: "The American people cannot complacently consider the presence of tanks and aircraft from Iron Curtain countries less than 150 kilometers from our shores." Thus, the Americans, already vulnerable to long-range missiles stationed in Russia, perceived the prospect of such weapons being placed right at their doorstep as an especially blatant provocation, especially since the American executive head had already publicly committed during his electoral campaign not to tolerate the presence of offensive weapons in Cuba.

Moreover, President Kennedy viewed the Kremlin's action as the foundation of a strategic imbalance. He stated, "this sudden and secret decision to deploy strategic weapons for the first time outside Soviet soil... constitutes a deliberately provocative and unjustified modification of the status quo, which cannot be accepted by our country." However, it is important to note that this argument did not gain unanimous support. This was notably the case with the then Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, who, assessing the impact of the missiles in Cuba on the strategic balance between the United States and the USSR, declared during the second meeting of the ExCom: "I asked the military, and they say 'substantially,' but my personal opinion is 'not at all.'"

On the Soviet side, there seemed to be an analogy drawn between NATO missiles in Turkey and the SS-4s in Cuba. For this reason, on October 16, 1962, Khrushchev expressed his astonishment to the new American ambassador in Moscow regarding Washington's reaction to the discovery of the missiles. "There is no cause for alarm," he explained in essence, "I have done nothing different than what you have already inflicted upon me in Turkey and Iran."

In this regard, Professor Jean-Yves Haine writes: "The balance is political and psychological before being military and strategic.... It is indeed the political perception of the strategic imbalance that partly motivates Khrushchev. It is not so much about bridging a quantitative gap but rather achieving qualitative

2.The Advent of the Era of Détente

It was at the height of the Cuban missile crisis that the foundations of the détente process were laid, which began to take shape as early as April 1963 and reached its peak in 1973 with the signing of a treaty on nuclear war prevention. The relaxation of tensions and the spirit of cooperation began to take precedence over the logic of confrontation.

21. The Signs of Détente

Characterized by a mix of firmness and restraint, the exchange of messages between Presidents Kennedy and Khrushchev, which led to the resolution of the crisis, foreshadowed a new turn in East-West relations during the Cold War.

The American response to the crisis reflected the mindset of the young U.S. president. The three diplomatic options considered by the crisis committee were: demanding the USSR withdraw its missiles, proposing a trade of Cuban missiles for U.S. bases in Turkey, or contacting Fidel Castro. Of the three military options—embargo on military shipments to Cuba, surprise air strikes on missile installations, and invasion of the island—it was the embargo (termed “quarantine”) that was adopted first. Thus, President Kennedy opted for a limited action while reserving the right to bomb missile bases if the embargo proved ineffective.

More symbolically, in his dramatic address on October 22, President Kennedy invited his Soviet counterpart to join in a “historic effort to end the dangerous arms race and transform the course of human history.” This call was not merely a diversion during the crisis but stemmed from a deep conviction that Kennedy expressed in his personal style. Even before his election, he had articulated his foreign policy ambitions in a dense book, "Strategy of Peace," encapsulating his spirit with the phrase: “It is time for us to not only react to every move of our adversaries but to begin to act for ourselves and to make the oldest dream of mankind—a lasting peace—a reality.” This concern remained constant, as he reiterated this sentiment in his inaugural address on January 20, 1961, calling for a "new beginning" and reminding both sides that “courtesy is not a sign of weakness, and sincerity must always be tested. Let us never negotiate out of fear; but let us never fear to negotiate.”

Fortuitously, these words resonated with President Khrushchev, who had promoted the policy of “peaceful coexistence” with the West since 1953. Adopting a softer approach toward the West seemed dictated by the necessity of a prolonged peace, from which Khrushchev hoped to gain to realize his grand economic projects and catch up to, if not surpass, U.S. industrial power. However, after facing Kennedy during a decisive trial (the Cuban crisis) and recognizing both his resolve and wisdom, Khrushchev appeared convinced of the need for tangible collaboration for peace. Thus, after expressing a desire for a “summit conference,” he wrote to his American counterpart on December 19, 1962: “It seems to me that it is time to put an end once and for all to nuclear testing,” and he expressed his readiness to “make half the journey.”

From the Cuban missile crisis emerged a climate of mutual understanding and a tacit agreement on the “rules of the game,” the results of which would soon materialize.

22. The First Steps of Détente

After the resolution of the missile crisis, the path to détente opened through American-Soviet negotiations, leading first to the installation of the “red phone” and then to the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, both clear signs of a new approach to international relations during the Cold War.

During the missile affair, communications between Washington and Moscow had been very defective. The classic method of delivering documents to the ambassador took considerable time for translation, encryption, and decryption before the recipient could be informed. Technical negotiations began in April 1963, resulting in an agreement on June 20 to establish a direct Teletype line between the White House and the Kremlin, aptly named the “red phone.” This system was intended to allow the supreme leaders to communicate quickly in times of crisis, marking an important gesture, especially during the Cold War. However, to materialize the durable détente desired by both sides, further bold actions were needed.

The Cuban crisis had heightened awareness of the dangers posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Negotiations on this subject began immediately after the crisis was resolved, but they stumbled over the issue of verification. Many American military personnel and some senators feared a duplicitous deal that would weaken national potential, while the Russians categorically refused to allow more than three inspections per year. It was only after the dismantling of Thor missiles in Turkey and especially after President Kennedy's important speech on June 10, 1963, at the University of Washington, that the atmosphere began to relax. Negotiations that had been suspended in January 1963 resumed around mid-July with the arrival of American and British representatives in Moscow. On August 5, they culminated in the signing of the Moscow Treaty on the Partial Test Ban.

Specifically, the Moscow Treaty of August 5, 1963, applies to “any nuclear test explosion or other nuclear explosion.” It prohibits nuclear explosions in three environments: atmospheric, extraterrestrial, and underwater; underground tests are not affected. Additionally, the treaty includes provisions related to nuclear non-proliferation, whereby each party commits to refrain from “provoking, encouraging, or participating, in any way, in the execution of any nuclear test explosion.” Consequently, China and France, unhappy with what they perceived as an attempt to consolidate the nuclear club at their expense, refused to associate with this treaty. Nevertheless, the historical significance of this text was considerable, as it paved the way for further negotiations despite President Kennedy's assassination on November 22, 1963, in Dallas, and Khrushchev's ousting a year later.

Following Kennedy's succession, Lyndon Baines Johnson quickly sent a letter to Khrushchev expressing hope for continued improvement in American-Soviet relations. On December 31, Khrushchev proposed that all governments sign an agreement renouncing the use of force to change existing borders. President Johnson responded rather openly, indicating a mutual desire for moderation, especially after the Gulf of Tonkin incident that propelled America into the Vietnam War. During this time, the TASS agency merely advised avoiding “further reckless and provocative actions in that part of the world.” Although Khrushchev’s ousting on October 15, 1964, temporarily stalled this warming of relations between Washington and Moscow, the emergence of a new leadership duo—Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev—allowed the détente process to be reignited and reach new heights.

23. The Golden Age of Détente

Characterized by a renewed global dialogue and institutional engagement between East and West, marked by a spirit of compromise and a mutual will to prevent and manage armed conflicts according to established principles of “good conduct” among American and Soviet leaders, the period from 1969 to 1973 marked the peak of détente, with significant achievements across various domains, the signing of the SALT I agreements being the most notable.

Indeed, beginning in 1968, relations between the two camps significantly improved under the influence of new leadership teams. A “détente” emerged in both principle and practice. This mutual willingness found fervent advocates in Leonid Brezhnev and President Richard Nixon, along with his foreign policy advisor and later Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. It is worth noting that the conjunction of the leaders of the two superpowers was based on divergent analyses.

On the Soviet side, Leonid Brezhnev was primarily concerned with consolidating the USSR's position in the world. Under his direction, the Kremlin pursued a cautious policy aimed at securing recognition from the opposing camp of the changes that had occurred since 1945 and the USSR's emergence as a global superpower. Moreover, learning from the prosperity of the capitalist world, he sought to utilize Western advantages to help the USSR close some of its gaps by securing favorable loans, grain supplies, and significant technology transfers.

Demonstrating realism, President Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger acknowledged that the West’s interest lay in negotiating with the USSR to control the arms race, manage key conflicts worldwide, gradually reduce East-West tensions, and develop commercial and technological relations with the East. Behind this reasoning, American officials harbored an ulterior motive. They hoped that the understanding between the two superpowers and the gradual integration of the USSR into a stable and orderly system would, in the long run, enhance the influence and position of moderates within the Soviet system. In the future, a developed and pacified Soviet Union might enter an era of a certain “centrism.”

This was the grand design of the American détente policy, which animated this period and had significant effects on international relations. Thus, the U.S. executive advocated establishing a “peace structure” based on durable accommodations with the USSR. Despite the differing approaches and the continuation of disparate interests, there was, for a few years, a convergence of the leaders of the two great powers, reminiscent of the anti-Hitler coalition between Roosevelt and Stalin. This climate of trust heralded even more remarkable outcomes.

Strategically, this resulted in the conclusion of the SALT I agreement and the initiation of preliminary negotiations for SALT II. Launched at President Johnson's initiative in January 1967, the SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) efforts culminated on May 26, 1972, in the signing of the SALT I agreement in Moscow by Presidents Nixon and Brezhnev. This agreement, of unexpected significance, comprises two essential components.

The first component is a treaty of unlimited duration that limits each party's deployment of defensive nuclear weapons, namely anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs). The second component is a temporary agreement establishing distinct ceilings for each power on the number of strategic offensive missiles that could be deployed over five years.