The interethnic clashes that occurred on the island of Borneo

Twelve years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the euphoria and hope for world peace and a reconciled humanity have come to an end.

New threats loom over the future, threats that we witness with feelings of anxiety and often helplessness. This sentiment is felt by everyone, corresponding to the hope we had to see, with the end of the Cold War, a more homogeneous and less conflictual world. This hope was not entirely unfounded. Peace has returned to the regional conflicts fueled by ideological confrontation: in El Salvador, Namibia, Mozambique, Cambodia, and Angola; it is also seeking its way between Israelis and Palestinians.

However, if these advancements in peace do not cast their light on the future, it is because they are overshadowed by new conflicts, new outrages that no one imagined would emerge so violently in the wake of the Cold War. These include, of course, civil wars and especially the increasing interethnic clashes that have multiplied across the globe, highlighted by the genocides in Rwanda, ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia, and the deadly violence currently experienced on the Indonesian island of Borneo.

Thus, in this general context of disorder, wouldn’t it be interesting to question the apparent causes as well as the possible solutions to halt this dangerous escalation?

Certainly, interethnic conflicts continue to grow and are not only a consequence of a new international order and intense proliferation of arms but also the result of a colonial legacy, compounded by economic disparities and political and religious crises. In the face of this escalation, the only solution could be education and a culture of peace based on tolerance and respect for human rights.

A review of the causes on a global scale, then intra-state causes, and finally the proposed solutions to end this dangerous escalation will illustrate the validity of the thesis put forward.

I - Causes on a Global Scale

Now, with the new international order, the current vision of conflicts and the illicit proliferation of conventional weapons have facilitated interethnic conflicts around the world.

11 - GEOPOLITICAL VISION

What is the international order after the Cold War? “The spectator discovers a complex and incomprehensible planet in place of a world simplified for years into two blocs… Very quickly, a new map of the world is proposed, as simple as the previous one but different.” The East-West geostrategic dualism is replaced by a North-South geopolitical opposition. A “nuclear and rational North” opposes a “conventional and mystical South”; the map of conflicts reflects this image of a chaotic and uncontrollable South. Roughly, one could draw a line starting from Mexico, passing through northern Africa and the northern Balkans, northern Afghanistan, along the northern borders of China, circumventing Japan; the areas below this line would be characterized by Hobbesian disorder. Ethnocentric, this discourse on a South perceived as a new barbarian corresponds to an “emotional state” of the post-bipolarity; the emphasis is placed on the chaos and global disorder after a bipolarity whose stability is exaggerated. Two examples, the Rwandan and Ivorian situations, can serve to refute the representation of conflicts originating from mystical and irrational sources. The differentiation, in Rwanda, between Tutsis and Hutus is not the product of some primitive hatred; introduced by the Belgian colonizer, the ethnic differentiation was instrumentalized and reappropriated by the extremist Hutu power. The latter called in 1994 for the massacre of the Tutsi minority and moderate Hutus suspected of preparing the ground for the power takeover by the Rwandan Patriotic Front, which was in exile in Uganda. To claim that conflicts do not obey any logic other than that of self-destruction is to forget the strategic goals pursued by those who are the primary beneficiaries. It should be noted that Ivoirité is not merely the impulse of a nationalist fever from the Christian southern population but also a political means to exclude the presidential candidate Ouattara from competition, arguing that he is Burkinabe.

The collapse of communism, which modified both the sources of legitimization and the structure of the bipolar order, transforms not so much the nature of conflicts but the meaning we assign to them. Thus, in the majority of the conflicts that have proliferated in recent years, the end of the Cold War primarily served to unveil the deep nature of ongoing conflicts or to substantially alter their significance. It has thus enabled a collective awareness at the global level of the “social roots of so-called local conflicts” (the use of the terms ‘local’ or ‘regional’ remains a relic of the vocabulary of global geostrategic analyses typical of the Cold War), which is reflected in the rise of ethnic and cultural particularisms and the overt recourse to identity or particularism.

The latest Balkan conflict due to the separatist ambitions of the province of Kosovo under Serbian domination exemplifies this phenomenon of exacerbated nationalism. Similarly, the Sri Lankan conflict, linked to armed separatist movements, persists, as do the Somali-Eritrean-Ethiopian wars (then Eritrean-Ethiopian) due to Ethiopia’s ‘rational’ desire to gain access to the vital Red Sea for its economy and even its survival (this concerns two of the poorest countries on the planet), all under the pretext of ancient territorial claims mixed with ethnonationalism.

These examples, among many others, illustrate what Philippe Mitrano qualifies as “conflicts related to the definition of territorial or separatist identities.” The prolongation of conflicts often causes the strategic or ideological dimension to lose prominence in favor of more sociological aspects of traditional wars. This does not, however, mean an exaggerated reduction of these conflicts to tribal or ethnic causes.

Separatist movements deny the sovereignty of the existing nation-state but retain the legal framework of the state as a model to reproduce; it is essentially just a border shift.

Ethnic conflicts take the form of internal uprisings and civil wars. These intra-state conflicts call for two remarks: due to the importance attached by Clausewitz to the question of “who fights?”, each individual is automatically assimilated to a combatant simply by virtue of their identity.

Finally, the confrontation, the conflict asserts itself with deliberate violence; it is on this criterion of violence that we differentiate conflicts from commercial, political, or cultural wars.

It seems that conflicts can only be understood through the state prism. The state is considered from a practical and symbolic angle:

• Practical angle, since the territorialization of conflicts is established based on state borders.
• Symbolic angle, the state being at stake (stake?).

The state, in the tradition of the nation-state, exercises sovereignty functions and embodies territorially and politically a specific community. The state thus encompasses two dimensions:

• The dimension of power (to which ambition for conquests and monopoly of legitimate physical coercion is associated).
• The dimension of meaning, the state manifesting a symbiosis of territory and identity.

The symbolic dimension of the political continually asserts itself in conflicts: The Balkans present, according to Anthony Smith, the “dangerous mirror of the ethnicization of the political”; this conflict can be situated on a European scale and shed light on ethnonationalism in Europe: the rise of ethnic nationalism has challenged the former process by which modernization and, in particular, the modern state contributed to the creation of nations from existing ethnicities. Perhaps it is worth recalling that the state is a historical social construct, a modern creation specific to a limited geographical area; before thinking about conflict through the state, shouldn’t we first question the current relevance of such a reference?

12 - TRANSNATIONAL VISION

Of course, the violence of guerrillas is not depoliticized. While there is a relationship between guerrilla violence and drugs, these insurgent movements pursue a political objective inspired by Marxism and are particularly influenced by it. If the inviolability of borders remains one of the principles of the world order, the state is no longer a closed, impenetrable entity. These flows that penetrate states are conflicts in gestation; while there may no longer be a risk of military aggression, these transnational forces challenge the sovereign power of states and are a factor in the decomposition of the states concerned.

We can then map these flows on the conflict map because these flows pose threats to the destruction of states. Indeed, many conflicts that appear local have an international resonance due to the intervention of other sovereign states, or even transnational in nature, as the new threats that fuel these conflicts are diffuse, whether they involve drugs, dirty money, or arms trafficking.

When Daniel Hermant speaks of international networks of violence, he illustrates how conflicts that we initially view on the map as local or regional conflicts, such as the conflicts between guerrillas and states in South America (in Chiapas, Mexico, Colombia, Peru, etc.), or between Pakistan and India, can also be understood through a broader, transnational lens. These conflicts are indeed supported by the transfer of arms and drug production. Terrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering, and illegal immigration are new perils that can also be mapped and are sources of conflict in more or less defined geographical areas.

In Peru, Colombia, and Pakistan, we speak of narco-terrorism; however, we should not establish a systematic relationship between violence and drugs. Nevertheless, the drug economy is undeniable in these countries and plays a role in fueling the opposition between the state and guerrillas. Henri Favre, in an interview with the journal Cultures et Conflits, shows that coca cultivation creates spaces for plantation and exploitation that are almost sovereign, while maintaining complex transnational networks that sovereign states struggle to combat. Indeed, narco-terrorism, while it is the weapon of the weak, of those who cannot gain recognition or who have given up on such recognition, undoubtedly leads to a relative decomposition of the monopoly on legitimate violence.

Furthermore, other transnational flows, which are not economic but social in nature, also sustain conflicts. It is delicate to speak of immigration and ethnic diasporas as factors of conflict; however, we must not forget that foreigners are often seen as 'barbarians' (from the Latin barbarus, meaning foreigner). Due to the technological ease of migration (various means of transport and extreme difficulties for states to effectively monitor their borders), the impact of immigration on national cohesion is stronger, with immigrants being both foreigners and actors in the social pact. We have indeed seen the repercussions of the "Kurdish problem" in Turkey in countries where a significant Kurdish community coexists with Turkish people. In Germany, although there is no open conflict, the transnational flows of migration have highlighted the interconnection of multiple networks (in this case, ethnic groups) within a sovereign state. Of course, incidents in Germany are far from being comparable to any classical conflict. However, they demonstrate how relevant the question of identity remains, even when we speak of world citizens...

But if classical threats are addressed through war (the victor imposing their will on the vanquished), what should be done in the face of terrorism or drug trafficking? These are multifaceted, proliferating realities organized into networks that are more or less decentralized and more or less vulnerable; in any case, these are dangers that are difficult to identify, very rarely confined to a single territory (deterritorialization).

While classical threats ultimately resolve through force, in the case of non-classical threats, force shows both its limits and its necessity: thus, it is necessary to combine repression and negotiation. However, it is delicate for a sovereign state to undertake the resolution of an interethnic conflict alone.

13 - Circulation of Conventional Arms

The end of strategic competition has made arms more available to exacerbate simple disputes, differences, or tensions that may arise between groups in their everyday lives.

As a result, this availability of light weapons, along with the duration and violence they can impose on conflict resolutions, encourages protagonists to turn away from conflict resolution and to resort more easily to violence, thereby creating a sense of insecurity that in turn leads to greater demand for and recourse to arms.

The anarchic accumulation and proliferation of light weapons become exacerbated, as there is very little or no regulation regarding the control of conventional arms, and the nature and quality of these weapons lend themselves easily to all sorts of trafficking. Additionally, small arms, due to their operational specifications, are well-suited to the types of conflicts that characterize the post-Cold War international system: whether in Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, the Central African Republic, or other crisis hotspots, it is these weapon systems that have fueled deadly wars, not between states, but within states between armed groups and factions without political or social bases.

Experts in the field have established that in 1996, approximately 35 million people in 23 countries around the world were experiencing one form or another of the consequences of interethnic conflicts; a report from a committee of U.S. government experts estimated that over 80% of the victims of wars involving small arms are not combatants but women and children; among child soldiers, more than 200,000 are under 16 years old.

The free circulation of arms has recently allowed certain ethnic groups to oppose the legality and legitimacy of the state with as much, if not more, means of violence. The state is no longer the sole holder of legitimate repressive power; it may find itself competing with other power centers possessing the same means; the emergence of such a phenomenon in the African political landscape is a factor of great vulnerability, chronic instability, and even the delegitimization of legally established powers, jeopardizing the fragile democratic processes initiated here and there.

II. Intra-State Causes

In each country where inter-ethnic conflicts rage, the legacy of colonialism and economic disparities intertwined with political and religious crises constitute the essential factors triggering violence.

21. Colonial Legacy

Colonialism created conditions conducive for different groups to compete for resources and positions in urban areas.

Colonizers often drew straight borders, creating new states with frequently geometric shapes that did not take into account the existence of different ethnicities; the gathering of traditionally hostile ethnic groups generally leads to periodic massacres, forcing populations to flee their home countries for refuge in other states. This is the case for the Tutsis and Hutus in Rwanda and Burundi, who took refuge in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo).

In fact, there has long been a clear social difference between Hutus and Tutsis; however, intermarriage between the two ethnic groups is common. Both peoples speak the same language, share the same culture, and have the same beliefs. Hutus and Tutsis form a pastoral nomadic people rich in elites who struggle to tolerate being dominated and are confident in their destiny. Tutsis have pursued a migration southward for centuries, being a minority in Rwanda and Burundi. Nonetheless, aided by the cultural permeability of a particularly malleable society, they monopolized leadership positions in structures that were almost feudal for them. In Rwanda, they were ousted from power by the Hutus, the first occupants of the land, right after independence in 1961; however, they managed to be included again in 1962. Two years later, an unrelenting civil war resulted in the systematic extermination of hundreds of thousands of Tutsis and Hutus who were not hostile to them, followed by the defeat of the Hutu majority, culminating in their exodus to Zaire.

In Burundi, where the history is not any less fertile in massacres, Tutsi power has always been maintained, except for a brief interlude in 1993 and 1994 due to majority rule; Tutsis have consistently found support from Uganda, where ethnic neighbors, the Hima, live. They soon, once their hegemony was restored in Rwanda, victoriously came to the aid of their nomadic brothers in Zaire, who had faced hostility from sedentary populations for generations.

22. Economic Factors

In the absence of transparent and universally accepted rules for the allocation of public resources, feelings of being wronged and jealousy have come to dominate inter-ethnic relations.

The frenzied race for power, both regional and national, plunged Nigeria into a bloody civil war around the mid-1960s. The defeat of the secessionists in 1970, followed by the oil boom, allowed for the implementation of ambitious policies aimed at managing ethnic relations and fostering a peaceful transfer of power to civilians after 13 years of military rule. However, the rivalry over control of oil revenues quickly reopened ethnic and regional fractures. The army struck again at the end of 1983 and has held power since then.

Recent changes in the economy and society have given a new dimension to the inter-ethnic political climate: after the decline of the oil boom in the early 1980s, ethnic conflicts spread to rural areas. The redefinition of boundaries set by the state and local authorities, as well as changes in land use and land ownership structures during economic austerity, explain this evolution. Information collected through interviews regarding several conflicts concerning communal land boundaries helps to explain the dynamics of this new form of political relations between ethnic groups.

23. Political-Religious Factors

To enjoy civil rights against a backdrop of religious antagonism, ethnic groups vie for power.

The sovereignty system of the state that emerged in Europe between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries extended across the globe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Some governments do not fully control their territories. While some handle more functions than others, all aspire, in principle, to control their entire territory to a certain level of activity, and this control is perceived as the expression of sovereignty, which is defined as the power to exclude the control of others. Inter-ethnic conflicts must be viewed in light of sovereignty norms, as some ethnic groups sometimes find themselves in control of a state, while others aspire to gain control or escape from it.

In this context, the Serbs amended the constitution in 1989 to remove Kosovo's right to a certain autonomy granted in 1974. In July 1990, the Albanian legislators of the province declared Kosovo an independent province from Serbia. Belgrade then dissolved the autonomous assembly and government of Kosovo.

For their part, the Albanians formed an unrecognized government and parliament and elected a president, Mr. Ibrahim Rugova. He then considered three possibilities for the political reconfiguration of the territory: an independent Republic of Kosovo; a Republic grouping the Albanians of Yugoslavia that would thus amputate the territory of Montenegro and Macedonia; and finally, the merger of Kosovo and Albania (M-F Allain and X. Galmiche 1992). The more radical Kosovo Liberation Army resorted to terrorist actions in order to obtain Kosovo's independence by force.

Moreover, Kosovo unfortunately became the birthplace of two antagonistic nationalisms. For Serbs, it was the site of the Patriarchate of Peć, established during medieval Serbia, and where Tsar Lazar was defeated by Ottoman Sultan Murad in 1389. The religious symbolism makes Kosovo the myth of reference for Orthodox Christianity. A large number of churches, chapels, and monasteries maintain the memory and religious loyalty of the Orthodox faith in a province predominantly inhabited by Muslim Albanians. For six centuries, the province of Kosovo has been the guardian of the memory of humiliations, frustrations, and hopes for the resurrection of the Serbian nation. Serbian nationalism is fueled by a history of terror led by a Turkish conqueror and Albanians held responsible for aggression, rapes, expropriations, and atrocities against homes and churches that were transformed into mosques and stables (Tinck 1998).

During the Ottoman era, the region underwent Albanization and Islamization. With the blessing of the Turks, the Albanians who converted to Islam spread throughout Kosovo. It became the cradle of the Albanian renaissance in the 19th century. They also claim Kosovo based on a very distant ancestry connected to the Thracians who occupied the Balkan Peninsula before the arrival of the Slavs in the 6th century.

The arrival of Slobodan Milosevic at the head of Serbia marked the adoption of the Yugoslav program for Kosovo. This program planned for the Serbian repopulation of the province, with substantial bonuses, preferential wages, and facilitation of property ownership, while the Albanians were forbidden from engaging in real estate transactions, and even the province's bank was abolished. The strategy aimed to restore Kosovo, "the cradle of Serbian civilization," to its "original owners," forcing Albanians to emigrate.

III- Solutions to Interethnic Conflicts

Preventing interethnic conflicts should involve education for citizenship within a pluralistic democracy that respects human rights, as well as the development of peace and tolerance.

31- Education for Citizenship

Education for citizenship must go beyond its traditional framework, which is limited to mere participation in community affairs, to encompass the behaviors and attitudes necessary for “living together.”

Etymologically, the term 'citizenship' derives from the Latin word civitas, meaning “the body of citizens.” This explains why education for citizenship closely relates to learning how to “live together” and develop social bonds. This endeavor is eminently ethical. It calls for dialogue, adherence to rules, defense of the democratic rights of minorities, and various ethnic groups. It aims to build defenses for peace, promote justice, and guarantee security among individuals.

Today, discussing citizenship involves less about participation in the public class than about repairing the damages inflicted upon it. Many cite the ‘civic deficit’ that contemporary societies, especially the youth, reportedly suffer from, along with the escalation of conflicts worldwide. These observations seem grounded, at least in part.

However, certain realities of our contemporary world appear to hinder these conditions for exercising citizenship. The principle of equality before the law is confronted by tangible forms of exclusion, such as unemployment, intolerance, and xenophobia. Citizens' participation in public affairs is often obstructed by their ignorance of these rights or their indifference towards the management of community affairs. The development and strengthening of political institutions, which some do not identify with due to indifference or lack of knowledge, face similar obstacles.

In fact, many diverse works focus on approaches to education for citizenship. What is important to note is the observed trend to break down barriers in this education by integrating it as much as possible into all educational activities. Until recently, the focus was primarily on including courses on “civic education” in the curriculum. The disciplines associated with this education were generally limited to history and geography, for instance, in France, or what Americans refer to as social studies. These courses historically centered almost exclusively on institutional domains, specifically the knowledge of political and administrative institutions and their functioning, laws, and national constitutions. Given the influence this educational process has on political and civic socialization, these contents should continue to be taught. However, it is essential to mention that education for citizenship must cover a much broader range of knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors to be acquired—a long learning process that should continue throughout life.

These modern foundations of citizenship find their expression in pluralistic democracy and human rights.

32- Pluralistic Democracy and Human Rights

As political and legal concepts, pluralistic democracy and human rights are among the preventive measures against interethnic conflicts.

Pluralistic democracy is a form of representative political regime that ensures equality of rights for all citizens; in this regard, every individual possesses an equal share of sovereignty through universal suffrage. This democracy relies on the recognition of political pluralism and its transformation into multiparty systems. It represents an organized structure comprising rules of operation and framed debates. It is where laws are constructed and take precedence over categorical interests. It embodies the very notion of a society governed by law, symbolizing the challenge of “living together.”

A characteristic feature of pluralistic democracies, individual freedom also implies the obligation to respect the freedom of others, thus including certain prohibitions. It also refers to an inner strength that renders the individual autonomous in their thoughts and actions. In history, it has served as a lever against oppression and tyranny. Learning about freedom accompanies the gradual withdrawal from egocentrism.

International law concerning human rights is designed as a structure composed of two main parts: the international instruments promulgated and adapted by the international community and ratified by states, as well as protection mechanisms to ensure their respect and effective application. In democratic countries, these rights are codified within the domestic law of each state, constituting positive law. These human rights guarantee the full exercise of citizenship, both civil and political, through the development of a state program aimed at integrating society, which should precede a broad discussion of this issue among representatives of ethnic and social groups within the country. Economically and socially, the exercise of this citizenship should commence with the equalization of the levels of social and economic development between the North and the South, which would contribute to harmonizing interethnic relations and rationally utilizing the country’s economic resources, including natural resources and labor reserves, while considering the polyethnic composition of the population and the needs of the historical homelands of national minorities.

Regarding human rights and individual liberties, which are characteristic of these democracies, they are conceived as a structure with two main parts: international instruments promulgated and adapted by the international community and ratified by states, along with protection mechanisms to ensure respect and effective application. These rights guarantee the full exercise of citizenship in civil and political matters through the development of a state program aimed at integrating society, which should precede a broad discussion of this issue among representatives of the country’s ethnic and social groups. Furthermore, on the economic level, by equalizing the levels of social and economic development between the North, the center, and the South of the country, this would contribute to the harmonization of interethnic relations.

Human rights also invoke multiple concepts that justify their promotion, such as the notions of human dignity, equality before the law, individual and collective responsibility, freedom of expression, and association. These terms help articulate our place in everyday life.

33- Culture of Peace and Tolerance

The development of peace and tolerance begins with a change in mindset, education, and international solidarity.

According to UNESCO's founding act, "wars begin in the minds of men, and it is in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be erected." This underscores the need to change mentalities to achieve integration objectives. Specific actions must be implemented at the levels of attitudes and habits required. In fact, certain negative attitudes and persistent prejudices make the integration of some groups more challenging. Hence, it is necessary to combat various forms of systemic discrimination and sometimes outright discrimination. Additionally, protecting and respecting the rights of all individuals and minorities without exception, as well as the spiritual culture of minorities and different ethnic groups, is crucial.

Solutions to integration-related issues should primarily be educational in nature, broadly defined, including the contributions of various public institutions and the media.

Thus, greater representation of various cultural minorities as spokespersons for groups, unions, or communities, as social workers, and as radio or television hosts can effectively contribute to reducing prejudice and fostering an inclusive attitude towards people from all backgrounds. This can be achieved through mass media as a tool for exchanging cultural values between communities and creating optimal conditions for the full operation of the state’s official language, as well as for protecting other languages spoken within the country.

Given that numerous activist groups are working to develop a culture of peace, tolerance, and non-violence, it remains that only the strength of global solidarity can create a culture of peace across the planet, through actions taken in both the North and the South. This involves protecting and respecting all human rights without exception, combating all forms of discrimination, fighting poverty, and ensuring endogenous and sustainable development for the benefit of all, in accordance with the notion of human dignity and respect for the culture and spirituality of indigenous peoples.

In this regard, UNESCO’s report on education for the 21st century, titled “Education: A Hidden Treasure,” states, “It is about learning to live together by developing knowledge of others, their history, traditions, and spirituality.” These remarks resonate with current discussions on future perspectives for global citizenship education.

The discourse on values appears almost everywhere discussions about citizenship education arise. This is understandable, given that the values mentioned above reflect a need for social cohesion, dialogue, and the reinforcement of democratic institutions at a time when social construction faces significant upheavals.

All these measures—education for citizenship, pluralistic democracy, and the development of peace—lead to changes in mentalities and contribute to the reconfiguration of individual and collective identities. They foster critical thinking, which acts as a bulwark against single-minded thinking. They embrace this diversity of beliefs and contribute, through the knowledge of how to think and act they promote, to a new form of "living together" in a democratic society, thus forming the best solution to interethnic conflicts.

CONCLUSION:

In summary, to end the various interethnic confrontations that tear apart several regions in the world, or at least to diminish their scale, adequate education and a culture of peace are imperative in light of the complex web of causes stemming not only from a widespread proliferation of conventional weapons but also from the inequitable border demarcations established during colonialism.

These reflections illustrate how interethnic conflicts ravage nations globally. Among multiethnic countries, Morocco, with its policy of tolerance, solidarity, and dialogue established by the Alaouite dynasty, has managed to preserve its unity and cohesion. Could this policy not serve as a model for countries afflicted by this scourge?