The Indochina War

At the end of World War II, Vietnam, like many other Asian countries that had experienced Japanese occupation, found itself at a crossroads. A race for power ensued between local nationalists and the former colonial power, both vying to either take control of the vacant power or reassert authority that had been questioned by the independence granted by the Japanese. This alone was enough to spark a deadly war of decolonization.

France needed to regain its colonial empire to maintain its status as a victorious, though war-torn, power in the post-war world. It had to navigate its relations with its wartime allies. France had not been present at Yalta or Potsdam, where the post-1945 world order was being shaped. At Potsdam, it was agreed that the Allies would take responsibility for receiving the Japanese surrender and disarming Japanese troops in Indochina. North of the 16th parallel, this task was given to Chinese troops, while south of the line it was assigned to Franco-British forces—but not exclusively to the French, even though Indochina had been their colony. France also had to contend with the firm anti-colonial stance of the United States and its ambitions for global and Asian leadership. From 1945, without the internal and external resources to support its colonial policy, France found itself at odds with the growing complexities of the Indochinese problem.

Meanwhile, the Vietnamese communists recognized that the power vacuum of August 1945 presented them with a unique opportunity to achieve their goals. Better organized and prepared for a power grab than other nationalist groups, they seized this moment to establish themselves as the sole negotiators, both domestically and internationally. By September 2, 1945, Ho Chi Minh's Democratic Republic of Vietnam became the first country where a communist party, skillfully hiding behind the patriotic motivations of the Viet Minh, successfully seized power. Their intent to exercise full, unshared control over national responsibilities was clear and unequivocal. Their resolve would only harden in response to their opponent's ability to resist.

On the other side, neither General de Gaulle, nor the men he appointed to address the Indochina problem, nor the French nation seemed prepared or willing to face the decolonization challenge awaiting them in Southeast Asia.

In the post-war context, by closing off any real possibility of independence and assistance from the non-communist world, Vietnam was inevitably driven toward the communist camp to determine its future. For the past 45 years, Vietnam has been condemned to war—to assert and defend its existence. Having chosen the communist path, Ho Chi Minh's Vietnam became entrenched in the Cold War, locked into insoluble dilemmas. External powers continued to weigh on and interfere in its history from that moment onward. At the most dangerous and decisive turning points in recent Vietnamese history, the free world, which had made Vietnam one of its strongholds, consistently neglected and abandoned it: in 1945 and again in 1954.

Among the many examples of blind stubbornness, one must include the forceful policies of d’Argenlieu and Bidault in Paris, General Valluy and Colonel Debès during the November 1946 events in Haiphong, which led to the Viet Minh uprising and radicalized the French response. France's double-dealing regarding a Republic of Cochinchina, playing on southern separatism while simultaneously engaging in negotiations with Ho Chi Minh in France, compounded the situation. Not to mention the intransigence of French colonists clinging to their privileges and the growing determination of the Vietnamese communists to win at any cost.

Until 1949, the French expeditionary corps achieved some success against a still-developing Vietnamese communist army. However, the shape of the war, which would culminate in the final battle of Dien Bien Phu, was already evident. Although better armed and equipped than the Viet Minh, the French lacked the decisive advantage: air power. In the famous words of Ho Chi Minh, it was the classic image of the French elephant chasing the Vietnamese grasshopper. The French held the roads and urban centers but hunkered down in blockhouses and fortifications stretched along the roads, making them difficult to defend. The elephant vainly chased the grasshopper, which easily blended into the landscape, becoming elusive. Another Maoist image applied here: the French never succeeded in isolating the fish (the communist army) from its water (the Vietnamese population) in order to capture it.

From the end of 1949, coinciding with the rise of the Chinese communists to power and their arrival at the Sino-Vietnamese border, China became the Viet Minh's rear base, providing them with men, advisers, and material. The French gradually had to evacuate their positions in northern Vietnam: first Cao Bang on October 3, 1950, followed by Thât Khê, Lang Son, Lai Châu, Lao Kay, and Dinh Lâp, culminating in the "successful evacuation" of the Na San stronghold from August 7-12, 1953.

On the other hand, General Giap experienced some setbacks and failures due to his premature offensives against French positions: the Battle of the Day, the failure at Nghia Lo, and his inability to prevent the evacuation of Na San. But by now, he had the initiative. This leads us to examine how the success at Na San contributed to the defeat at Dien Bien Phu.

While Na San was an undeniable success for the French expeditionary corps and the troops defending it, the decision by French military leaders to establish a similar stronghold at Dien Bien Phu ultimately led to failure. This was due to the strengthened Vietnamese forces in terms of manpower and equipment, and especially the isolated location of the French logistical bases.

To understand this, we will study the success of Na San before analyzing the defeat at Dien Bien Phu, which can be explained by the Vietnamese forces' reinforcement and the distance of French logistical bases from the operational zone.

I I-The context of NA SAN

11. Tactical and Geographical Situation

Nasan was not originally intended to be an air-ground base, primarily because this tactical concept had never really been implemented on such a scale nor organized.

The French High Command's policy in the Thai region was as follows: since the region had been relatively spared by the Viet Minh so far, the goal was to "hold the ground" in Thai territory, something difficult to achieve elsewhere. Numerous posts were thus dispersed across the territory. However, their size did not allow them any freedom of action against the Viet Minh divisions when they decided to bring hostilities to the Upper Region. The strategic concept of an air-ground base was born under the pressure of the Viet Minh offensive, in a very challenging geographical context.

The numerous skirmishes starting from October 14th led the command to fear strong enemy pressure, which the various posts would not be able to withstand.

As Sonla became increasingly threatened, it became urgent to protect it as quickly as possible. General Salan decided to bring all French posts—now too easy prey for the three Viet Minh divisions—to Nasan, which was located on the main road 41 (RP41) from Hanoi to Lai Chau. Nasan had a dakotable airstrip and was meant to gather the entire Middle Black River deployment.

Nasan was, for the moment, only a rear base, allowing the French units to maintain a certain freedom of action that had to be preserved at all costs, according to General Linares, in order to counter this North-Western campaign aiming to "tear the Thai country from French influence."

By the end of October, the Viet Minh offensive seemed to slow down at the end of this first phase. "It appears that the adversary must pause for the regrouping of its units, organizing its new rear positions, and preparing for a new phase. The reorganization period should not be less than a week." This pause allowed the French command to take the initiative and to seek to channel the Viet Minh offensive toward Nasan. To do so, it was essential to buy time:

• by establishing a warning system on the Black River,
• by weakening the enemy's concentration efforts, a principle dear to General Foch.

If sufficient, this delay would allow General Salan to rethink Nasan's role, which had been, since the initial plan on October 18th, just a transit base with only the airstrip protected from enemy raids.

The retreat to Nasan diverted more than half of the Viet Minh forces from the main objective of the campaign. Their overwhelming numerical superiority had been reduced to near parity, and part of the threat was averted from the ZANO (Autonomous Zone of the North-West).

From November 17th onwards, skirmishes multiplied along the Black River. To the northwest in the Tuan Giao region, the 2nd BPC and the 56th BVN managed, after hard fighting, to join forces on the evening of the 16th. However, the violent fighting allowed the Viet Minh to achieve its goal in the sector: to cut off French forces from Lai Chau and Nasan.

To the northeast, the energy of Giap's troops increased, and events accelerated. On November 18th, the III/1st RTM was attacked by several rebel battalions north of Moc Chau. Simultaneously, pressure mounted on Balay, which was captured on November 19th. The Yen Chau post was heavily hit on the same day. The order was then given for all Franco-Vietnamese elements to regroup at Nasan.

The initial idea was to make Nasan the logistical base of the GOMRN (Middle Black River Group). The French command could not assess what would happen along the Black River. When it became certain that the Viet Minh offensive would continue, Nasan was transformed into a center of resistance.

"Since we are retreating around this airfield, and there is no other 'exit,' it is necessary to hold it 'with no intention of retreat,' and people are already talking about a 'Verdun in Thai country.'"

However, the morale of the troops, severely shaken over the past 15 days by Viet Minh divisions, would be at its highest when they realized that the organization of the entrenched camp's resistance was already well underway.

Initially, the French command had been shaken by the speed of the Viet Minh offensive, awaiting the enemy's initiatives while trying to hold the ground. But General Salan quickly changed tactics and took the initiative. His "evolving" tactical sense would make the difference during the upcoming confrontation. General Salan realized that the enemy's objective was the destruction of French forces, not territorial occupation. Nasan would allow the protection of as many expeditionary forces as possible inside the entrenched camp while regaining the initiative. Occupying territory became less important than destroying enemy forces. In defensive combat, the balance of power favored the French, who were rich in experience and equipment.

It seems impossible to study the Nasan air-ground base without considering its geographical context and the constraints and consequences it imposed on combat. Only by studying it can we understand the difficulties each soldier had to overcome, from the pilot to the legionnaire or the rifleman who had to "dig in."

For General Salan, the choice of Nasan was essential due to its location at the heart of Black Thai country, where Giap had launched his offensive.

"Located at the geometric center of the routes linking Lai Chau to Thanh Hoa, northern Laos to the Black River and the Red River, Nasan offers the advantage of having a 'dakotable' airstrip accessible year-round, whose defense can be easily organized from the surrounding mountainous terrain. This airstrip is 190 km as the crow flies from Hanoi, a 40-minute flight for a Dakota with a range of nearly eight hours. Fighter and bomber support is also readily available. Its position astride RP41 cuts off the only communication route for trucks and carts coming from northern Annam to Lai Chau and Dien Bien Phu. It also provides coverage for Laos in the only region where the battle can be fought under the best possible conditions."

For General Salan, who quickly recognized the site's potential, "Nasan is the ideal air-ground base for operations in the Upper Region." On October 18, 1952, when Nghia Lo was captured by Viet Minh units, the only two airstrips capable of supplying the northwestern battle were Lai Chau and Nasan.

Lai Chau, though the administrative capital of Thai country, was "out of the way" compared to the battlefield, and its airstrip was difficult to defend.

Nasan, on the other hand, had the advantage of being located on RP41, equidistant from Moc Chau and Tuan Giao, near the important center of Sonla and the two road routes leading to the Black River. Positioned at the center of the battlefield, and appearing as a threat to the Viet Minh's rear if they ventured north into Laos, the choice of Nasan became obvious. On the morning of October 18th, the General commanding the FTNV (North Vietnam French Forces) visited Nasan and decided to make it the "anchoring point of the defense," in accordance with General Salan's choice.

Nasan was based at a crossroads of communication routes. But in this case, it wasn't about using them but rather blocking them, to hinder a potential Viet Minh advance towards Laos, thanks to the difficulties posed by the terrain. Unlike Hoa Binh, where perilous and unpredictable road connections were necessary, Nasan was free of such dependence. All connections would be made by air.

The airstrip, 1,200 meters long and 40 meters wide, was oriented east-west. Its red soil, rich in laterite (due to the decomposition of the former forest), was excellent in dry weather. The weather was generally good in this five-kilometer-long and two-kilometer-wide valley. "The ceiling was often high enough even when all the airfields in Tonkin were clouded over."

The surrounding terrain, with ridges running perpendicular to the runway and parallel to each other like a series of waves, allowed a defensive setup keeping the airstrip out of enemy infantry fire and sight. The hills were made of laterite, not limestone, allowing easy digging at their summits.

Finally, Nasan was located on limestone plateaus, dominated to the southwest by the Phac Mo massifs (about 15 km away) and the Maison limestone hills (about 8 km from the airstrip), and bordered to the northeast by the deep trench carved by the Black River. There were enough water sources for supply (some peaks had their own springs). Nasan, meaning "small rice field," was only inhabited by seasonal workers who came there during the rice-growing season. Small hamlets were scattered within a 20-kilometer radius around the valley, with the largest settlement being Maison.

12/ The role of the air-land base.

During the eight months of existence of the Nasan air-land base, a concept took shape that would greatly influence future operations in Tonkin. The originality of the air-land base lies mainly in an aerial supply that allows the Resistance Center to bypass ground communications.

The definition of this air-land base concept, initiated at Nasan, highlights the fundamental role that aviation must play and the continuous logistical support it demands.

Until the Việt Minh offensive in the fall-winter of 1952-1953, the French expeditionary forces were not accustomed to conventional combat encounters in what General of the Army ELY referred to in his report as "the great voids". However, some previous operations had influenced the French command in this direction. During the previous Việt Minh campaign, the French had developed the tactic of the hedgehog.

As early as October 19, when Nghia Lo had just fallen, General SALAN laid the foundations for this new strategy of air-land bases, essentially resistance centers relying on aerial means. It was the culmination of various unique combat methods imposed on the French since the beginning of the war. The Việt Minh warfare system involved evading powerful attacks, concentrating to overwhelm, at a ratio of ten to one, weak, isolated, or poorly guarded opponents at night, then withdrawing, regrouping, and resupplying in the Upper Region, where they could not be pursued. The expeditionary corps was incapable of forcing regular Việt Minh units into battle. The challenge was to compel them to fight.

Experience showed that small resistance centers, comprising multiple strongpoints protected by field works, often attracted massive Việt Minh attacks and possessed unparalleled stopping power. By luring them to such "prey", a combination of artillery and aviation could successfully defeat them. This led to the creation of fortified camps, supplied by a securely guarded road.

At Nasan, the air-land base circumvented the heavy constraints of roads through an airlift, organizing itself behind the current battlefield to become the "resistance anchor against which enemy units would break, from where armed forces would launch to pursue and complete their destruction".

The Nasan air-land base could only be conceived thanks to the use of military and civilian aviation in all its forms. "I must emphasize," wrote General SALAN, "the crucial role of aviation. Without it, Nasan would not have been possible, and I would have lost the battle in the Northwest." Structures facilitating effective liaison and utilization of aviation were organized at the base, which had well-defined resources. These resources were assigned roles either in support or in direct or indirect support missions.

The support mission of the Nasan air-land base, fulfilled by aviation from October 1952 to August 1953, was predominant and certainly one of the primary factors in the success of this new tactic. The scale of the operation, especially as an innovation in tactical terms, garnered admiration worldwide.

During the installation between October 16 and November 30, 1952, Nasan's airstrip received 702 civilian Dakotas, 655 military Dakotas, and 116 Bristol Cargos. Thus, air transports brought fifteen thousand passengers from eleven battalions to Nasan, evacuating medical cases and civilians in return, amounting to a traffic of twenty-two thousand people. Freight amounted to three thousand tons during the same period, including engineer materials and equipment, ammunition, supplies for the garrison, and a hundred and twenty-five vehicles.

In summary, the airlift operated almost daily for six hours at a rate of one aircraft every ten minutes, ensuring Nasan's existence. On crisis days, the rotation rate could reach one hundred aircraft, facilitated by the proximity of Hanoi (approximately 200 km).

With the air forces freed from the need to fight for superiority in the third dimension, formations could fully dedicate themselves to direct and indirect support missions, including surveillance and intelligence gathering. Independent actions, such as bombing aimed at destroying Việt Minh potential in their rear areas, though beneficial to the defense of the resistance center, only indirectly concerned Nasan.

The sudden establishment of the air-land base, as desired by General SALAN, two hundred kilometers from Hanoi in the midst of the Thai Black Country, posed significant logistical challenges. This added to the general difficulties faced by logistics in the Indochina War, constantly seeking solutions to fluctuating and unfavorable situations, given the distance from the metropolis (two months by sea, 12,000 km) and the limited budget allocated to the Indochina War. Moreover, industrialization, which had begun to emerge in 1939, had only regressed since then. However, the air-land base mobilized all energies, and the means allocated were substantial. They combined with traditional organizational efforts within the French Army when faced with logistical challenges. The study of logistics excludes the Engineer Corps, whose role is more focused on the defense of the Resistance Center, although it depends entirely on aerial connections like other components of logistics: health services, supply, equipment, and fuels. The logistics mission evolved simultaneously with that of the Resistance Center. However, the organization and resources at its disposal allowed effective adaptation despite encountered difficulties.

The successive missions received by the G.O.M.R.N. all share a common factor: "Nasan must be considered an inviolable operational base and defended at all costs."

*From October 19 to November 19: The mission of the G.O.M.R.N. primarily involves gathering engaged elements and posts north of the Black River, which retreat south under the protection of air-transported reinforcement units to Nasan. Units in retreat directly request their resupply by parachute from Hanoi, while units south of the Black River are resupplied by land from Nasan. As the tactical situation evolves rapidly, only the command of the G.O.M.R.N. can assess the utility and necessity of these requests. From the first days of November, its Fourth Bureau centralized all resupply requests from all units, whether in retreat or not, ensuring these demands were met either from depots established at Nasan or through parachuting from Hanoi.

*From November 19 to November 30: The mission of the G.O.M.R.N. becomes a delaying action mission south of the Black River, allowing the necessary time to fully organize the fortified camp at Nasan for its defense at all costs with all the retreated elements. The influx of reinforcement elements on the Black River necessitates the centralization in the hands of the Fourth Bureau of the G.O.M.R.N. of all available transportation means. Furthermore, while bringing to the fortified camp at Nasan what is needed for organization and resistance, daily resupply, through all means (road, airstrip, parachuting), is essential for the elements conducting the delaying combat.

While the missions of the G.O.M.R.N. may vary and impose new logistical burdens, the logistics organization at Nasan remains unchanged and will even be streamlined from April onwards. A note from the G.O.M.R.N., dated February 6, 1953, strictly defines the framework for organizing the air-land base, comprising:

-A Resistance Center, divided into quarters and tasked with preserving the stronghold's integrity. -A base inside which permanently house services ensuring the maintenance of G.O.M.R.N. potential, temporarily including its units.

Under the direct command of the General commanding the G.O.M.R.N., the colonel commanding the Resistance Center at Nasan serves as the direct chief of the Resistance Center and as the delegated commandant of Nasan's stronghold. The Colonel commanding the Nasan Resistance Center is responsible for establishing services and organizations constituting the Nasan base. Deciding on service locations according to an overall plan, he ensures they are well protected while not neglecting their close defense through their own means. He particularly coordinates their close defenses.

If logistics represent the "lifeline" of the air-land base, the organization of the Resistance Center's defense represents its tactical interest and raison d'être, as Nasan appears as an island amidst vastness where the Việt Minh maneuvers freely. This defense has been the subject of successive plans that have gradually shaped it into a "Hedgehog", with supporting weapons as strengths and strongpoints as the backbone.

II/ The Influence of Nasan and the Underestimation of the Enemy

The influence of the battle of Nasan, the strengthening of Vietnamese forces, and Chinese aid are all factors that contributed to the tragedy of Dien Bien Phû.

21/ The Influence of Nasan

The success encountered at Nasan foreshadowed a doctrine that was believed, at the time, to effectively counter the fluidity of the Viet Minh. Indeed, the principle of force economy and the ease of applying the concept made it suitable for regions where conventional combat, which would enable a clear victory for one of the two sides, was impossible.

Every force system includes two elements: one dynamic and the other static. Resistance Centers of varying importance serve as anchors for the maneuvering of mobile forces.

From a land maneuver perspective, these centers can simultaneously or successively serve as:

• A blockage on communication routes,
• A launch base for offensive reactions,
• A gathering zone for forces dislocated by the enemy.

From a joint maneuver perspective, they provide:

• Protection for an air and logistical infrastructure. Their location is determined to allow air forces to operate across the entire operational space, essentially creating an aero-terrestrial base.

In Indochina, these aero-terrestrial bases represent support zones for combined maneuvers within the unique theater of operations in Northwest Indochina. While the current balance of forces calls for a defensive strategic stance, only an essentially offensive tactic can, through the gradual destruction of enemy forces, enable the command to regain the initiative.

In a general sense, what advantages can an aero-terrestrial base provide to command in terms of force economy and freedom of action?

Marshal Foch once wrote that the principle of force economy is the art of concentrating all resources at a specific moment on a certain point, applying all available forces there, and ensuring they communicate with each other rather than compartmentalizing or assigning them to a fixed, unchanging destination. Once a result is obtained, these forces must then converge toward a new single objective.

He added:
“It is the exploitation of this new property of organized force—the capacity for resistance—that, combined with the already known property of shock power, constitutes the principle of force economy in practice. The principle in execution consists of defending with minimal force while delivering the maximum attack. The means to achieve this economy of force is to mount these forces into a system.”

This is precisely what General Salan did. The experience at Nasan allowed him to apply these principles to a new form of combat. As part of a defensive system, the aero-terrestrial base can be seen as a built-in factor for force economy. Its defensive role, however important, must remain subordinate to that of mobile forces. The number of bases and the volume of resources allocated to them must respect this hierarchy of values. Without it, the balance of forces would be disrupted. Additionally, the resources must align with the command's intentions for their use.

Thus, General Salan’s doctrine advocates for a deep grid of Resistance Centers, all operating on the same principle.

The effectiveness of the maneuver initiated in November at Nasan was confirmed by the defensive victories of December. Based on these lessons, General Salan decided to extend the system of “entrenched aero-terrestrial camps” to Laos.

Depending on the overall and local situations, and the role that the French Command decides to assign them, not all aero-terrestrial bases have the same missions. Laichau and especially Nasan were intact but "masked" by the Viet Minh. Knowing that the upcoming spring 1953 offensive targeted Laos, General Salan decided to stop it deep into enemy territory when Giap's troops would be far from their rear lines. Therefore, he created two new aero-terrestrial bases based on the Nasan experience: the "Plain of Jars" (development work began on March 17, 1953) and Luang Prabang (starting April 24, 1953). These two Laotian aero-terrestrial bases were formed using troops from Nasan, who were later replaced.

This tactic represents an early version of the “grid of Resistance Centers” that General Salan referenced in his testament:

• An advanced line: Laichau – Nasan, whose primary role is offensive, aimed at disrupting the rear of the Viet Minh forces operating in Laos, as well as their supply lines, while also serving a defensive role in case of emergency.
• A stopping line: “Plain of Jars” – Luang Prabang, intended to halt the Viet Minh before they reach the Mekong region and potentially launch a counter-offensive if the enemy retreats.

However, aware of the operational capabilities of these bases, as well as the significant material and human resources they require, the High Command, despite drawing heavily from the lessons of Nasan, does not seem eager to perfect this employment doctrine.

The command of the Expeditionary Corps, particularly the 3rd Bureau, seeks to rapidly extract as many lessons as possible from the Nasan operations.

The influence of the battle of NASAN, the strengthening of Vietnamese forces, and Chinese aid are all factors that contributed to the tragedy of Dien Bien Phu.

21/ The Influence of Nasan

The success at Nasan introduced a doctrine believed at the time to be capable of overcoming the fluidity of the Viet Minh. The principle of force economy and the ease of applying this concept allowed its use in areas where conventional warfare, which would "enable a clear victory for one of the two sides," was impossible.

Any system of forces includes two elements: one dynamic, the other static, with Resistance Centers of varying importance serving as anchor points for the maneuvering of mobile forces.

On the ground, these centers can simultaneously or successively serve as:

• A barrier on communication routes,
• A base for offensive reactions,
• A fallback zone for forces disrupted by the enemy.

In interservice maneuvers, they serve to:

• Protect an aerial and logistical infrastructure, and their location is determined to allow air forces to operate throughout the operational space: essentially, these centers act as an air-ground base.

In Indochina, air-ground bases represent support zones for the combined maneuvers in the unique operational theater of northwestern Indochina. While the balance of forces dictates a defensive strategic stance, only an essentially offensive tactic, through the progressive destruction of enemy forces, would allow the command to regain initiative.

In general, what advantages can an air-ground base provide in terms of force economy and freedom of action?

Marshal Foch wrote, "The principle of economy of force is the art of concentrating all one's resources at a specific moment on a point, applying all forces there, and ensuring their communication instead of compartmentalizing them. Once a result is achieved, they should converge again toward a new unique goal."

General Salan applied this principle through the experience at Nasan, incorporating it into a new form of combat. Air-ground bases, as part of a defensive system, are inherently a factor in force economy. Their defensive role, however crucial, must remain subordinate to mobile forces.

The effectiveness of the maneuver, first seen in November at Nasan, was confirmed by defensive victories in December. Bolstered by these results, General Salan extended the "entrenched air-ground camp" system to Laos. However, despite the operational capacity of these bases, they require significant material and human resources, leading the High Command to avoid perfecting this employment doctrine.

22/ Formation and Armament of the Vietnamese Forces

By mid-1953, the war in Indochina had entered its eighth year. The Viet Minh, aided by the local population and supported by the Chinese since the armistice in Korea, had grown into a well-organized and highly mobile force. The Chinese assistance proved critical, equipping Vietnamese divisions with modern military training and equipment, which significantly enhanced their combat capability.

This Chinese support played a key role in modernizing the Vietnamese army, making them a formidable opponent for the French Expeditionary Corps, as they developed expertise in modern military tactics, artillery use, and other combat techniques.

Relieved of this concern about assisting North Koreans against the United Nations, Beijing could now dedicate its surplus resources to help the Viet Minh and equip them with modern equipment. In the summer of 1953, there were fears that this Chinese assistance could weigh heavily in the upcoming battles, and there was even concern by the fall of 1953, at the time of the capture of Diên Biên Phu, that it might translate into aerial actions in favor of the Viet Minh.

Except for the 308th, the Viet Minh had no divisions before 1950. In the two years from 1950 to 1951, the Chinese largely armed five Vietnamese infantry divisions, namely the 304th, 316th, 320th, and 325th, along with a mixed division (engineering-artillery), the 351st. Several regiments of these new divisions were equipped in Chinese territory, especially in Yunnan and Guangxi. The People's Republic of China (PRC) authorized the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) to establish a military academy in Yunnan to train and instruct its personnel. Vietnamese instructors were advised by Chinese experts. To facilitate the acquisition of modern military techniques, the staff of the Senior Military School of the Ministry of Defense was transferred to Yunnan in 1950.

These cadres studied elements of tactics and strategy, the modern deployment of units on the battlefield, the use of artillery in line battles, air defense, as well as shooting methods, handling grenades, dynamite, and tactics for taking enemy fortifications. Numerous military and political texts were translated into Vietnamese and used in these classes. Other Chinese documents were sent to Vietnam. A young Vietnamese soldier in China at the time noted that: “supplies are more than sufficient,” adding that “in terms of morale, the international spirit of the Chinese troops is highly developed and we benefit from it to improve ourselves.”

The number of cadres trained in China during this period gives an idea of the importance of this external aid in modernizing the Vietnamese army. In June 1950, 3,100 Vietnamese cadres had reportedly received training in China, including: 1,200 infantry cadres, 400 artillery cadres, 150 communication cadres, 200 secret cipher cadres (along with 300 air force cadres and 200 naval cadres yet to be created).

The contribution of these individuals would be essential for the proper conduct of military operations in Vietnam. Without these technically skilled cadres, familiar with the fundamentals of modern military techniques, Chinese assistance could not have been used effectively. For the DRV, modern military science largely went through this little-known Asian route.

23/ Role of Chinese Advisors in the Battle of Dien Bien Phu.

The Chinese continued to serve as advisors to the General Staff of the Vietnamese army during the following battles. A handful of Chinese advisors were indeed present during the famous Battle of Diên Biên Phu. According to Vo Nguyen Giap, the Chinese advisors attached to his General Staff agreed to concentrate Vietnamese attacks as early as 1952 on the Northwest and in the mountainous areas with difficult access. In light of the military consolidation of the delta by the expeditionary corps, this reorientation aimed to create a peripheral route around the delta to link North Vietnam to interzone IV in the center of the country. It also aimed to open a route towards southern Indochina and to spread the war into Laos. According to Qiang Zhai, it was the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that proposed to attack Northwestern Tonkin and Northern Laos. Zhou Enlai discussed this plan with Stalin in September 1952; both wanted the DRV to negotiate with France from a strong position. On October 28, 1952, Ho Chi Minh discussed new operations in northern Indochina with Stalin and Liu Shaoqi in Moscow.

Whatever the true reason, the Viet Minh's attack plan ultimately changed. Attacks in the Northwest and Laos would lead France to abandon Lai Chau in November 1953 to occupy the strategic crossroads of Dien Bien Phu. Determined to destroy the Dien Bien Phu post for military and political reasons, the Vietnamese Politburo approved the attack plan in December.

Vo Nguyen Giap was to command the operation with assistance from Mai Gia Sinh and Wei Guoqing. On December 8, 1953, at kilometer 15 on the Tuan Giao-Muong Thanh road, a Sino-Vietnamese discussion took place regarding the combat tactics at Dien Bien Phu. Everyone agreed with Mai Gia Sinh's idea that the Vietnamese should "attack quickly to win quickly." The plan was to attack by "human wave" and to take the Dien Bien Phu post in two days and three nights before it could be reinforced. Vietnamese sources acknowledge that the Vietnamese General Staff agreed with Mai Gia Sinh. The French battalions at Dien Bien Phu were still few in number and without solid fortifications.

The Vietnamese army had heavy artillery and, for the first time, anti-aircraft defense. According to Hoang Van Thai, the chief of the General Staff at the time, the Soviet Union had provided the DRV with equipment to outfit six battalions of 37mm anti-aircraft guns in early 1953. By June 1953, socialist assistance enabled the Vietnamese army to create its first heavy artillery regiment (the 45th regiment). Thus, external aid in heavy weapons had apparently significantly developed since the first half of 1953.

On January 5, 1954, Vo Nguyen Giap went to the front, accompanied by Wei Guoqing. Mai Gia Sinh was already there with Hoang Van Thai. Before departing, Ho Chi Minh entrusted Giap with the directive that he must win this battle 100%. If he could not do so, there was no point in engaging Vietnamese forces. Around January 11 or 12, 1954, the attack plan was approved by the Vietnamese military authorities (although subject to subsequent modification if necessary). The attack was scheduled for January 20, 1954, at 5:00 PM. However, since late November, the French expeditionary corps had significantly increased its forces at Dien Bien Phu. At the same time, the Viet Minh faced enormous logistical difficulties, especially in transporting anti-aircraft artillery to the site. Furthermore, Giap's army had never fought during the day in a large-scale battle according to the Chinese tactic of "human wave." For these reasons, Vo Nguyen Giap first began to postpone the attack to the 25th, then to the 26th of January. Yet, by that date, his artillery had still not fully arrived. Giap was very concerned about this. So much so that on the 26th, he decided to speak with Wei Guoqing, suggesting that it would be better to change the attack plan. According to the general, it was no longer possible to attack quickly to win quickly. Vo Nguyen Giap explained that it was now necessary to "attack surely to advance surely." In his view, the site of Diên Biên Phu had become, in the meantime, a formidable fortified position, supported by tanks, artillery, and protected by an air force. Without artillery and anti-aircraft defense, Giap was unwilling to attack.

According to the Vietnamese, Wei Guoqing agreed with this idea. Giap then gathered the Party's military commission, explaining that the attack needed to be canceled. A premature offensive, in the Chinese manner, risked repeating the crushing defeat at Nasan. According to the interpreter and liaison officer between Giap and the Chinese military advisors present during the discussions of January 1954, there was no heated debate about the method of combat between the Chinese and the Vietnamese; rather, there was a shared understanding that it was appropriate to change course due to the circumstances.

Thus, while the acquisition of new means and the tactical contributions of the Chinese helped bring about the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, the distance of the latter from their logistical bases accelerated this failure.

III. The Contribution of Logistical Support Difficulties to the Tragedy of Dien Bien Phu

The remoteness of French logistical bases from Dien Bien Phu accelerated the defeat of the expeditionary corps and resulted in enormous losses on both sides.

31. The Remoteness of Logistical Bases

It is important to mention Na San, as it was a Dien Bien Phu before the fact. The military leaders of Indochina, when deciding in November 1953 to launch the operation at Dien Bien Phu, hoped for the same success as Na San, often referring to it. NAVARRE, in contemplating the creation of a base at Dien Bien Phu as early as June 1953, envisioned nothing more than a transfer from Na San, which he could not continue to support simultaneously. Additionally, there was Lai Chau, further north, which mobilized significant resources.

NAVARRE had a grand principle: "One can only defeat by attacking." He decided to attack at Dien Bien Phu, creating an aéroterrestrial base to cut off the Viet Minh from the Laos route and protect this associated state, which had just proclaimed its total independence. The Viet Minh had suffered a bloody defeat at Na San. Why not repeat it at Dien Bien Phu? In addition to defending Laos, NAVARRE wanted to create a fixation point and a solid anchor in Thai territory. He aimed to attract the elusive Viet Minh forces and control an essential route for the adversary. Dien Bien Phu could also become a powerful advanced aéroterrestrial base from which offensive operations could be launched in the region.

When the French decided to invest in Dien Bien Phu, they were aware that regular Viet Minh forces from the 316th division of the 148th regiment and the 910th battalion had occupied Dien Bien Phu and its region since October 1952.

General NAVARRE considered the Dien Bien Phu basin as the largest in the High Region (16 km x 7) and as the hub of routes connecting Laos, Thailand, Burma, and China. It was a compulsory passage for the Viet Minh, who would find it very difficult to bypass it through poor, rugged mountain and jungle paths at high altitude. The existing airfield, built in 1920, was susceptible to significant improvements and extensions, allowing for the landing of heavy aircraft. Furthermore, the basin's floor was a true plain of over 100 km², which would allow for the excellent employment of armored vehicles.

These were the arguments in favor of the operation at Dien Bien Phu. Finally, the French command considered that in the autumn of 1953, the Viet Minh, given the remoteness of its bases—500 km from Dien Bien Phu—could only maintain two divisions in the area. It was also concluded that they could only engage in brief battles, having limited artillery that would be easy to destroy.

Colonel PIROTH, who was to command the artillery of the entrenched camp, assured in early 1954 that his cannons were capable of quickly neutralizing any Viet Minh bombardment attempts. In short, all the conditions for a new Na San seemed to be in place, and the French were preparing to replay that scenario.

However, the disadvantages of such an operation were also recognized by the leaders:

• The remoteness of Dien Bien Phu from the airbases in Hanoi would lead to a heavy support and maintenance burden.
• The positioning of the intended outpost was "in a hollow," but it could not be otherwise, and thus it had to be accommodated.
• Ground troops would depend on aviation; only air routes would constitute the umbilical cord with Hanoi.
• The weather conditions were very variable in the High Region, which could impede any aerial intervention.
• The operational range of fighters taking off from Hanoi, 350 km to the east, was limited.

Despite this, "occupying Dien Bien Phu and accepting the battle" appeared to the commander-in-chief as the best solution, giving him a chance to save Laos with the forces he had.

Ideally, he would have liked to create Dien Bien Phu while maintaining Na San, which would have forced the Viet Minh to divide its forces to engage both camps. However, the crisis of manpower and his limited resources prevented adopting such a costly solution.

32. The Progress of the Battle

The attack was anticipated, as the Viet Minh had ensured that all inhabitants in the valley were evacuated in the days leading up to it.

On that day, it is said that in his command post at Muong Phan, halfway between Dien Bien Phu and Tuan Ciao, Ho Chi Minh, surrounded by his staff, smilingly removed his colonial helmet, turned it upside down, and said while clenching his fist inside the helmet: "The French are here." Then, slowly running his finger around the edges of the helmet, he added softly, with a knowing look: "And we are here..."

The Viet Minh attack occurred on the evening of Saturday, March 13, 1954, following intense artillery preparation, particularly targeting Béatrice (northeast stronghold) and Gabrielle (north stronghold). The artillery fire was extremely dense, with nearly 9,000 rounds, continuing throughout the night.

Despite fierce and bloody combat, with heavy losses on both sides, the Béatrice stronghold was captured by the Viet Minh within a few hours. In the evening of March 14, the previous day's scenario repeated itself with the Gabrielle resistance center (north) as the target. At 2:30 a.m. on March 15, the enemy managed to establish a foothold on the northeast face. By 5 a.m., the Viet Minh overwhelmed the position, whose main defenders were killed or wounded. The French counterattack in the morning of March 15 failed.

The survivors of the two strongholds were collected, but the northern and northeastern cover of the overall Dien Bien Phu defense had vanished. Colonel PIROTH, responsible for the artillery, aware of having gravely underestimated the adversary, committed suicide.

On March 18, the 3rd Thai battalion left the Anne Marie center, which was defending the northwest access. This center was immediately reorganized: part of it was abandoned, and what remained was attached to Huguette, which defended the airfield in its northern and northwestern section. Living conditions at Dien Bien Phu, constantly shelled by artillery, became increasingly difficult. The Viet Minh sought to cut the route to Isabelle to isolate each stronghold. Medical evacuations became increasingly precarious. The airstrip was constantly bombed.

Soon, daytime landings became impossible, and it was only at night, with all the associated risks, that planes could attempt to land. After a few days, it was necessary to abandon this entirely. The risks were too great, and too many planes were hit. The last helicopter was shot down during takeoff on March 23. The last plane managed to evacuate a few wounded on March 26.

General GIAP of the Viet Minh proceeded to methodically suffocate the base by digging a vast network of trenches that encircled the strongholds. The enemy thus infiltrated the camp. The trenches they dug were intended to isolate the different resistance centers and to serve as a launching base for assaults on the strongholds, sheltered from enemy fire. They never relaxed their efforts, harassing and bombarding the positions daily.

At the height of the battle, between assaults and amidst the noise of explosions, the Viet Minh, using loudspeakers, harangued the besieged and invited them to desert. They primarily targeted the legionnaires, knowing their adventurous spirit, and the North African and African troops, who might be more sensitive to the anti-colonial arguments they employed. They promised safe passage to deserters, material benefits to those who joined their ranks, and a swift release.

On March 30, following another very intense artillery preparation, the Viet Minh launched an assault on the main strongholds that dominated and protected the eastern part of the aéroterrestrial base. Very quickly, Dominique 2 and Eliane 1 fell into the hands of the adversary, who, fortunately, failed before Dominique 3 and Eliane 2, where a battle ensued that would last several days.

On March 31, Dominique 2 and Eliane 1 were reoccupied, but due to lack of reinforcements, they had to be evacuated at the end of the day after the engaged units had suffered heavy losses. The frontal attacks only ceased on April 6, but the area of the aéroterrestrial base, dominated at short range from Dominique 2, had to be significantly reduced, and communication with Isabelle became impossible. Air drops became increasingly exposed to enemy fire. The losses were significant, and many wounded piled up in the surgical tents where doctors operated under unimaginable conditions. Their tireless dedication and availability were exemplary.

By late April 1954, the underground hospitals of the entrenched camp were full, and the strongholds overflowed with un-evacuated wounded, who stagnated in the mud of the precarious command post shelters. They numbered in the hundreds, and the least affected continued to man automatic weapons behind the trench parapets.

Amidst the wounded from the entrenched camp, dozens of captured Viet Minh wounded were equally treated by French doctors who worked tirelessly.

Since late April, as air drops became less and less effective and often fell into Viet Minh lines due to the narrowness of the French perimeter and the intensity of enemy anti-aircraft fire, the enemy prepared to launch its final offensive after replenishing its forces and ammunition stocks.

The heavy, incessant downpours drowned the besieged and hampered aerial interventions. However, the old saying of Marshal Joffre: "When it rains on you, it also rains on the enemy" remains valid.

The Pilots' Struggles