PRINCIPLES AND MODALITIES OF EXECUTION IN A PEACEKEEPING ACTION

I. PRINCIPLES RELATING TO THE CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

In a peacekeeping action, the three principles of the art of war remain valid:

• Freedom of action
• Economy of means
• Concentration of efforts

However, the specificity of this type of action also leads to the establishment of two additional principles that, in conventional operations, are included within the previous three:

• Unity of action
• Security of troops

11) Freedom of Action

Freedom of action relies on availability, security, decentralization, and coordination. In a peacekeeping action, many political and humanitarian factors tend to reduce the freedom of action of military leaders. These factors include:

• The political significance of any action or deployment (and its possible exploitation), which sometimes leads higher echelons to impose specific arrangements and volumes of forces for a given action.
• The presence of populations often in distress.
• The fragility of logistical routes, whose maintenance is subject to the goodwill of the parties involved.

Therefore, military leaders must continually seek to preserve a margin of freedom concerning the different actors to be able to react. Special attention should be given to the maneuvering of reserves (to achieve a favorable and deterrent balance of power, thus avoiding the necessity to take escalated measures) and to freedom of movement.

12) Economy of Means

Economy of means (where "economy" is understood in its primary sense: the art of good management) relies on defining the objective (the famous question: "What is it about?"), the specificity of systems, the coherence of their allocation, the flexibility of structures, and cooperation.

In applying this principle, military leaders must be concerned with integrating external means (civilian UN agencies, local entities) that, when legally required, can enhance the specific employment of military means. Furthermore, risk assessment must be a constant criterion.

13) Concentration of Efforts

The concentration of efforts relies on intelligence, local superiority, surprise, agility, and planning. While some of these classic criteria may seem contrary to the spirit of peacekeeping, it is essential to note the following clarifications:

• It is crucial to deploy sufficient means to, even without absolute military superiority, leverage deterrence. For this:
  • Be continuously informed about the political, military, economic, and humanitarian environment.
  • Always have reserves available (as external support is often weak and/or subject to prohibitively long intervention times).
  • Plan responses to any possible actions from factions and populations against the implementation of the mandate. Every plan must consider the potential use of force and the consequences of its non-use.

14) Unity of Action

The civilian-military dimension of a peacekeeping action, the multiplicity of civilian partners, and the multi-nationality of the Force highlight the necessary acknowledgment of the principle of unity of action.

This principle is fundamental for the action of staff, especially at the Force level, and is also important at the unit level: leaders, regardless of their level, must continually act coherently concerning the political-military directives received from command and the local actions of other partners.

15) Security of Troops

The security of troops engaged in a peacekeeping action takes on a particular dimension due to the following three factors:

• The major interests of contributing nations not being involved (which is one of the factors for the UN's acceptance of various contributions to ensure impartiality), nations (government and public opinion) would not accept excessive losses.
• The potential use of weapons, even when controlled and managed, can place units of the Force in a delicate situation against factions that generally possess superior means.
• The protection of the Force's units significantly contributes to the credibility of the Force for both factions and populations.

Consequently, risk analysis and the determination of the threshold of acceptability are essential elements in conducting military action.

II. LOGISTICAL PRINCIPLES

Different UN documents outline the following five principles:

• High initial autonomy of units
• Centralized conduct of support
• Execution of support from rear to front (to be adjusted according to circumstances)
• Separation of functions: conduct of support and finances
• Civil-military mix

Note: A foundational document regarding the organization of support for the Forces ("Field Manual Handbook") is currently being developed at the United Nations Headquarters.

21) Initial Autonomy of Units

The initial autonomy imposed by the UN upon the deployment of a Force is generally 60 days. This figure is explained by the fact that the command of the Force deploys, at best, at the same time as the first units, while the establishment of supply chains requires several weeks.

This level of autonomy can then be reduced; however, it generally remains at 30 days to account for transportation delays between supplying countries and the theater, as well as safety stocks to maintain at all positions of the Force. These stocks can be 15 to 30 days for food, water, and fuel, and the equivalent of 6 units for ammunition.

22) Centralized Conduct of Support

Regardless of the volume of the Force, support is generally managed by the Force's staff. Even though different levels of operational command exist between the Force and the battalion or detachment, the latter addresses its requests to the Force's staff; intermediate levels may be informed to monitor the operational readiness of the unit and intervene on its behalf to address urgent matters.

However, this general rule can be adapted in certain Forces, where intermediate-level commands receive total or partial logistical responsibilities.

23) Execution of Support from Rear to Front

The logistical unit of the Force ensures all deliveries directly to the units, as well as the evacuation of destroyed or damaged assets needing repair beyond the unit level.

However, a weakening of transport capabilities or a tense situation may exceptionally impose:

• Breaks in load (establishment of intermediate depots)
• The requirement for units to recover their supplies from an intermediate depot or the Force's logistics base using their own means.

24) Separation of Functions: Conduct of Support and Finances

While support is managed by the Logistics Division of the military staff of the Force, financial decisions—whether for purchasing complete equipment or simple spare parts—are made exclusively within the Administration Affairs Directorate.

25) Civil-Military Mix

This mix is a constant that affects all levels:

• The Command of the Force, as military logisticians must work closely with civilian financiers and logisticians (the latter taking on increasing importance).
• For executing support, some functions may be fully or partially delegated to civilian companies: repairs (at the 3rd/4th echelon), transport (direct delivery of supplies, for example), etc., at the logistics base, with military units possibly responsible for supporting certain civilian cells.

III. ACTION TOWARDS BELLIGERENTS

The general attitude towards belligerents arises from the implementation of the principles of action outlined in the previous chapter. However, three points deserve further elaboration: liaison, negotiations, and incident management.

31) Liaison with Belligerents

Basic principle: The more developed the liaisons with the various parties, the more informed one becomes, and the more the safety of the Force’s units is guaranteed. However, it is important not to leave total initiative to subordinate levels and to organize these liaisons:

• Physical Liaison: At various levels of the Force's command, permanent exchanges of liaison officers are often carried out; within the units, it is necessary to define with the parties the officers designated for this mission at different levels (battalion, company), even if it is not their primary task. This mutual personal knowledge, which should not evolve into partisan familiarity, contributes to the establishment of credibility and trust for the Force. Liaison officers must be alerted to the fact that they will face attempts at misinformation or pressure from the parties involved. Furthermore, special attention should be given to locally recruited interpreters, as their reliability and standing with factions may vary; some may inform one of the parties.

• Technical Liaison: Establishing permanent technical liaisons is also essential. These liaisons mostly rely on wired communications (field telephones, civilian telephones) rather than radio communications (favoring point-to-point connections that are more discreet and conducive to trusting exchanges).

32) Negotiations

For military personnel, negotiations are specific to peacekeeping as this category of operations often leads them to be involved at all levels. Negotiations are rarely bilateral, except at lower levels (company), where they generally limit themselves to mediation and conciliation actions; negotiations are often civil-military and involve representatives of the various parties to the conflict.

Some individuals possess particular qualities for conducting negotiations; however, no negotiation should be improvised and must follow these steps:

• Determination of objectives
• Preparation of negotiation procedures (including security measures)
• Definition of negotiation rules and mechanisms
• Conduct of the negotiation
• Dissemination of the conclusions of the negotiation, the implementation modalities of the agreements, and their monitoring by the Force

The importance of this issue and the lack of practice for most officers has led to the development of a negotiation guide.

33) Incident Management

An "incident" is defined as any action by one of the parties contrary to the mandate and subsequent agreements. The general process for management is as follows:

• Development of the incident
• Protest from one of the parties
• Investigation by the United Nations
• Negotiation
• Monitoring of the application of the obtained agreement

Precisions for the implementation of this process may be included in the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). The intervention of the United Nations, which often concerns military leaders on the ground, must be quick, clear, and firm.

Initially, the following measures should be taken:

• Remind the parties of the position, role, and impartiality of the Force.
• Strengthen liaisons at all levels with all parties.
• Prepare the personnel to be ready for any change in the situation.